Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports
2011

An analysis of strategic interaction between government
jurisdictions
George R. Crowley
West Virginia University

Follow this and additional works at: https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd

Recommended Citation
Crowley, George R., "An analysis of strategic interaction between government jurisdictions" (2011).
Graduate Theses, Dissertations, and Problem Reports. 3357.
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/etd/3357

This Dissertation is protected by copyright and/or related rights. It has been brought to you by the The Research
Repository @ WVU with permission from the rights-holder(s). You are free to use this Dissertation in any way that is
permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you must obtain
permission from the rights-holder(s) directly, unless additional rights are indicated by a Creative Commons license
in the record and/ or on the work itself. This Dissertation has been accepted for inclusion in WVU Graduate Theses,
Dissertations, and Problem Reports collection by an authorized administrator of The Research Repository @ WVU.
For more information, please contact researchrepository@mail.wvu.edu.

AN ANALYSIS OF STRATEGIC INTERACTION BETWEEN
GOVERNMENT JURISDICTIONS

George R. Crowley

Dissertation submitted to the
College of Business and Economics
at West Virginia University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of

Doctor of Philosophy
in
Economics

Russell Sobel, Ph.D., Chair
Brian Cushing, Ph.D.
Tami Gurley-Calvez, Ph.D.
Donald Lacombe, Ph.D.
Santiago Pinto, Ph.D.
Department of Economics

Morgantown, West Virginia
2011

Keywords: Leviathan; Fiscal decentralization; Fiscal federalism; Intergovernmental
competition; Constitutions; Diffusion
Copyright 2011 George R. Crowley

ABSTRACT
An Analysis of Strategic Interaction Between Government Jurisdictions
George R. Crowley

This dissertation consists of three essays, each examining a type of strategic interaction between
government jurisdictions. Specifically, I explore the effect of distributive politics in the
legislature on intergovernmental competition, how fiscal decentralization serves as a constraint
on Leviathan government, and how state constitutions are designed in response to neighboring
institutions. In essay one, I combine the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) „Leviathan‟
model with the seminal Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) „Law of 1/n‟ to show that the
effect of increased decentralization on government size is limited by associated increases in
legislature size. Essay two employs two distinct empirical strategies to test the „Leviathan
hypothesis‟ that fiscal decentralization decreases government size. While the theory holds at the
municipal and county levels, school districts exhibit relatively high tax rates while
simultaneously high levels of interdependence. This suggests collusive behavior at that level. In
the final essay, I perform the first spatial econometric test of diffusion of constitutional rules. I
find that provisions in neighboring constitutions are a key determinate of the types of provisions
found in a given state‟s constitution.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Strategic Interaction Between Government Jurisdictions
Strategic interaction amongst governments has been identified as having major implications by
scholars in both public finance and public choice. Traditionally, interaction has been explored in
the context of intergovernmental competition in the vein of Tiebout (1956). Brennan and
Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) identify intergovernmental competition as a key to limiting
Leviathan government while Mintz and Tulkens (1986) and others analyze it in the context of
efficient public good provision. Numerous empirical studies following both of these theoretical
approaches have appeared in the literature.
While the majority of the literature on strategic interaction between government
jurisdictions has focused on competition, other types of interaction have been considered. The
influential work of Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) focuses on interaction between
legislators in the context of distributive politics. In the political science literature, the theory of
diffusion explores the „spread‟ of policy adoption across governments. The widespread adoption
of the Missouri Plan for state supreme court justice selection is the classic example (Puro,
Bergerson, and Puro 1985).
This dissertation contributes to each of these strands of the strategic interaction literature.
First, I synthesize the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) „Leviathan‟ model with the
Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) „Law of 1/n‟ to form a framework which explains how
the effect of increases in legislature size may be partially offset by related increases in
intergovernmental competition. Second, I reexamine the Leviathan hypothesis using a
combination of Laffer curve estimation and spatial econometrics on a dataset comprised of three
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different levels of local government. Finally, I model the diffusion of constitutional rules across
the U.S. states, again using spatial econometric techniques.
The following sections provide summaries of each chapter of this dissertation. Each
summary provides a brief motivation and then discusses the major contribution of the essay.
Finally, each summary briefly discusses the findings.

1.2 Legislative vs. Administrative Jurisdictions
Chapter 2 synthesizes the seminal „Law of 1/n‟ model of Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981)
with the similarly influential „Leviathan‟ model of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980).
Each of these models suggests a relationship between the overall size of government and the
number of jurisdictions within the government‟s purview.1 Interestingly, the 1/n and Leviathan
theories predict completely opposite effects of an increase in the number of jurisdictions. While
the Leviathan hypothesis posits an increase in the number of competing jurisdictions will lead to
a smaller overall size of government, the Law of 1/n predicts a positive relationship. The key
distinction lies in the type of jurisdiction considered by each: Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen
(1981) focus on legislative districts while Brennan and Buchanan (1971, 1978, 1980) are
concerned with lower-level governments. For this reason, these theories have been heretofore
considered separately in the empirical literature.
The Law of 1/n is essentially a common pool problem. Legislators seek projects (funded
by the legislature as a whole) for their districts so long as the costs borne by their constituency

1

There has been considerable debate in both empirical literatures about the type of „government spending‟ is
appropriate for testing each theory‟s implications. While the 1/n literature has typically used the level of
government associated with the legislature (state or national), the Leviathan literature has used local government
spending, total spending of all governments, etc. in its empirical studies. I use total state and local government
spending which will be positively correlated with whatever definition is preferred. Additionally, my robustness
checks contain several other measures of spending.
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are exceeded at the margin by the benefits related to the projects. If one assumes that district tax
shares for projects approved by the legislature are inversely related to the number of districts (for
example, a regime where each district pays an equal share) the tax burden borne by each district
falls as the number of districts increases. Thus, the number of inefficient projects will increase
as a result of each legislator systematically underestimating projects‟ costs.
The Leviathan model is based on the notion that governments, when left unchecked, seek
to maximize their size. The only possible constraints in the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978,
1980) framework are a strict fiscal constitution or the presence of intergovernmental
competition. The idea that competition between governments limits Leviathan-type behavior
follows from a monopoly view of government. As the number of competing governments is
increased, the monopoly power achieved by any one is weakened. In other words, the
„Leviathan hypothesis‟ suggests that as the number of competing governments increases, the
overall size of government will fall.
The main contribution of the chapter is the linking of these models. Since the Law of 1/n
predicts a positive relationship between the overall size of government and the number of
legislators and the Leviathan theory predicts a negative relationship between the number of
governments and government size, the strength of the relationship between the two types of
jurisdictions has serious implications. For example, if an increase in the number of
administrative districts (say, counties) also represents an increase in the number of legislative
districts the effect on government size may be ambiguous as the Law of 1/n and Leviathan
theories operate against each other.
I exploit the variation in this relationship across the U.S. states, and show that while both
the Leviathan and Law of 1/n theories hold when tested separately, the marginal effect of an
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increase in the competing administrative jurisdictions is lessened by associated increases in
distributive politics in the legislature. Further, the degree to which the Leviathan hypothesis is
weakened is directly related to the degree to which the number of legislative districts is related to
the number of sub-state governments. This helps explain the inconsistent results found in the
empirical Leviathan literature—these previous studies do not account for associated increases in
government spending due to larger legislatures.

1.3 Fiscal Decentralization and the Constraint of Leviathan
While the implications of the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) Leviathan theory of
government has been tested extensively, the empirical literature has yet to arrive at a clear
consensus concerning its validity. Following Oates (1985) the majority of these studies seek to
test the so-called „Leviathan hypothesis‟ by analyzing the extent to which increases in fiscal
decentralization (and thus, an increase in the level of intergovernmental competition) lead to
decreases in the size of government. The methodologies vary, with several measures of
decentralization being considered. Many studies have found the negative relationship predicted
by Brennan and Buchanan, but nearly as many have found little to no evidence.
Chapter 3, coauthored with Russell Sobel, uses a new approach to reexamine this familiar
question. Our methodology contributes in a variety of ways. Our analysis models true
Leviathan „behavior‟ by considering the property tax rate as the choice variable instead of simply
looking at the level of revenue or expenditure. Our dataset is also quite extensive, covering three
levels of local government (municipalities, school districts, and counties) in the state of
Pennsylvania for a period of ten years. Our estimation strategy consists of two parts. First, we
use a Laffer curve [see, for example Laffer (2004)] methodology to find each level of
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government‟s revenue-maximizing tax rate. We then compare the average rate of each level to
this maximizing rate by using a „Leviathan ratio‟ developed in the paper. The size of this ratio
indicates the extent to which local governments are able to behave in a manner consistent with
the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1985) model. We follow this analysis with a spatial
autoregressive model typically used to measure tax competition [see, for example, Brueckner and
Saavedra (2001)].
Our Laffer curve findings indicate the expected effect of decentralization (as defined by
the number of governments) as a constraint on Leviathan, with municipalities (of which there are
many) setting tax rates on average much further below revenue-maximization than counties (of
which there are relatively few). These results are also confirmed by the spatial autoregressive
model, with each level of government exhibiting positive spatial dependence, and the magnitude
of that dependence being higher for municipalities than counties.
Interestingly, school districts do not fit this mold. While there are more school districts
than counties, there are more municipalities than school districts. School districts on average,
however, set tax rates nearest to the revenue-maximizing level. Further, school districts exhibit
the highest degree of spatial dependence as well. We propose a framework for interpreting these
seemingly contradictory results which depends on the proper interpretation of the spatial
autoregressive model as measuring „interaction‟ rather than specifically „competition.‟ With this
in mind, the school district result of high interdependence and high tax rates is suggestive of
collusion, which has been shown to be an effective way to circumvent intergovernmental
competition (Shadbegian 1999).
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1.4 Spatial Dependence in Constitutional Constraints
As noted above, strategic interaction between governments is typically explored in the context of
fiscal policy or distributive politics. However, other types of interaction have been discussed in
the literature including the concept of policy diffusion. In general, the political science notion of
diffusion is concerned with “the relative spend and the spatial patterns of adoption of new
programs” (Walker 1969). While several studies have explored the adoption of policies and
programs, little work has been done on spatial patterns of constitutional rule adoption.
Chapter 4 uses the theory of diffusion, along with the work of Holcombe (1991, 1992,
1994, 1998) on constitutions to motivate a spatial analysis of constitutional constraints in the
U.S. states. To this point, analysis of diffusion has typically been restricted to case studies or
non-spatial econometric models. In contrast to these approaches, I employ a spatial probit
estimation of nineteen specific constitutional provisions. I analyze rules ranging from the
extensively studied (such as balanced budget requirements) to the more obscure (such as a
formally defined official language). My results find significant spatial dependence across a
variety of constitutional constraints, providing evidence of diffusion of institutions across the
states.

1.5 Conclusion
The final chapter summarizes the findings of the previous essays, reiterates the policy
implications, and provides suggestions for future research.
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Chapter 2
Local Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n
2.1 Introduction
In their seminal paper on distributive politics, Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) posit the
„Law of 1/n‟ which states that as the number of legislative districts („n‟) increases, the tax share
of public expenditures borne by each („1/n‟) falls. This in turn leads to an increase in the number
of inefficient projects passed by the legislature and, ceteris paribus, an increase in total
government expenditure. In a similarly important contribution, Brennan and Buchanan (1977,
1978, 1980) present a „Leviathan‟ model of government which assumes government‟s objective
is to maximize its size. In the context of this model, government can only be constrained by
either a strict fiscal constitution or intergovernmental competition resulting from fiscal
decentralization. In other words, according the Law of 1/n the number of legislative districts is
positively related to the size of government, while the Leviathan model proposes a negative
relationship between the number of governments and government size.
This paper is the first to synthesize these theories. While a voluminous literature has
concerned itself with the extension and empirical testing of these models separately, a unified
model has thus far not been developed. This is most likely due to the fact that the work of
Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) deals with legislative districts while the Brennan and
Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) model is based on administrative districts such as counties. While
it may seem natural to assume a standard, relatively constant relationship between administrative
and legislative districts exists across states, this is in fact an unsafe assumption. In fact, the
degree of „overlap‟ between legislative and administrative districts varies widely across the U.S.
states. In this paper, I capitalize on this variation to empirically test the degree to which the
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intergovernmental competition inherent in the Leviathan model is partially offset by the Law of
1/n.
I present a model where state and local government spending is dependent on both the
number of lower level governments (as in the Leviathan literature) and the size of the legislature
(as in the 1/n literature).2 When analyzed separately, each of the above theories holds as
predicted by their respective models. The main contribution of the unified model, however, is
that the negative effect on government size associated with increases in intergovernmental
competition is lessened by related increases in legislature size. The extent of this effect is
determined by the degree to which legislature size is linked to the number of lower level
governments. In states where the link is strongest, the marginal effect of an increase in the
number of seats in the legislature is significantly less than it would be in an otherwise
comparable state with a relatively weak linkage. In other words, if the increase in the number of
lower level governments is also indicative of an increase in legislature size, the 1/n effect
partially offsets the effect of increases in intergovernmental competition.
Far from being a purely theoretical issue, this unified analysis has serious implications for
past empirical tests of the Law of 1/n or Leviathan hypotheses. Studies of the Leviathan
hypothesis which do not include the size of the legislature are failing to account for associated
increases in spending attributable to distributive politics; this will lead to results which
underestimate the effects of intergovernmental competition on spending. Similarly, studies of
legislature size which do not account for the number of sub-state governments are likely
overestimating the 1/n effect. The theoretical model presented below demonstrates that by

2

The use of state and local government spending as the dependent variable is consistent with empirical studies in
both the Leviathan [see Nelson (1987) and Wallis and Oates (1988) for examples ] and Law of 1/n [see Gilligan and
Matsusaka (1995, 2001) and Primo (2006) for examples] literatures.
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focusing only on the partial effect, these studies are assuming away the relationship between
legislative and administrative jurisdictions. The extent of the associated biases is a function of
the strength of the link between the two types of districts.
This paper proceeds in the following manner. Section 2 provides a summary of the
previous theoretical and empirical work following the Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981)
and Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) contributions. Section 3 presents a model which
unifies these two approaches. Section 4 discusses the data and empirical approach used to test
the model‟s implications. Section 5 presents the empirical results, while Section 6 offers a series
of robustness checks. Finally, the last section offers concluding remarks and policy implications.

2.2 Previous Literature
The Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) Law of 1/n is essentially a common pool model.
Legislators seek projects for their districts so long as the costs associated with the projects are
exceeded at the margin by the related benefits. If one assumes that district tax shares for projects
approved by the legislature are inversely related to the number of districts (for example a regime
where each pays an equal share) the tax burden borne by each district falls as the number of
districts increases. Ceteris paribus, the number of inefficient projects will increase as a result of
each legislator systematically underestimating the project‟s cost.
Numerous empirical studies have tested this straightforward implication. Studies using
the U.S. states as the unit of analysis are most common [for example, Gilligan and Matsusaka
(1995, 2001), Primo (2006), and Chen and Malhotra (2007)]. Other jurisdictions examined
include U.S. cities (Baqir 2002), counties in the state of Georgia (Bradbury and Stephenson
2003), and an international sample of countries (Bradbury and Crain 2001). These studies
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generally find evidence of the Law of 1/n in unicameral legislatures and the upper chamber
(senate) of bicameral legislatures. While Gilligan and Matsusaka (1995, 2001) find no such
relationship for lower chambers (house), Primo (2006) and Chen and Malhotra (2007) find a
negative relationship between lower chamber size and spending, indicating lower chambers may
be uniquely immune to the Law of 1/n.3
Chen and Malhotra (2007) use this discrepancy between upper and lower chamber results
as the basis of their theoretical extension which explicitly models bicameral legislatures. Their
model posits, and the results of their empirical specification support, a negative relationship
between the ratio of lower to upper chamber size („k‟) and spending. The authors refer to this as
the „Law of k/n‟ since the forces work on spending in opposite directions. Other theoretical
extensions include Primo and Snyder Jr. (2008) (who show the Law of 1/n is dependent on a
number of factors including the cost-sharing regime in place and the project‟s size and type) and
Crain (1999) (who shows that constituent diversity within and between districts affects the Law
of 1/n).
The Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) Leviathan model is based on the
assumption that governments, left unchecked, seek to maximize their size. Within the model, the
only possible constraints on the Leviathan government are a strict fiscal constitution or the
presence of intergovernmental competition. While a great deal of the theoretical work by
Brennan and Buchanan focuses on the strict fiscal constraints, empirical examination of the
Leviathan model has relied almost exclusively on the proposed relationship between fiscal
decentralization and government size.

3

This lack of a „1/n effect‟ in the lower chamber has been a consistent finding in the empirical literature, and a
discussion of why the theory does not to hold for lower chambers is beyond the scope of this paper. For a possible
explanation, see Chen and Malhotra (2007) who model legislature chambers in a game-theoretic bargaining
framework. Further examination of this issue is clearly an area ripe for future research.
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That competition between governments constrains Leviathan is based on a model of
government as a monopoly. As the number of competing governments is increased, the
monopoly power achieved by any one is weakened. In the words of Brennan and Buchanan
(1980), “Total government intrusion into the economy should be smaller, ceteris paribus, the
greater the extent to which taxes and expenditures are decentralized.” In later work, Buchanan
(1995) refers to fiscal decentralization as an “ideal political order.” In the extreme, competition
between governments may approximate market outcomes (Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994).
This efficiency-enhancing competition between jurisdictions is clearly influenced by the work of
Tiebout (1956).
A voluminous empirical literature has been devoted to testing the link between
decentralization and spending, which is often dubbed the „Leviathan hypothesis.‟ This previous
literature has returned mixed results. Many studies find no relationship between decentralization
and government size [see Oates (1985, 1989), Forbes and Zampelli (1989), Anderson and van
den Berg (1998), and Heil (1991) for examples] while many others provide evidence of the
Leviathan hypothesis‟s validity [examples include Zax (1989), Joulfaian and Marlow (1990),
Nelson (1986, 1987), Eberts and Gronberg (1988), Grossman (1989), Marlow (1988),
Shadbegian (1999), Rodden (2003) and Stansel (2006)]. This divergence in findings is striking
given the variety of methodologies, units of analysis, and definitions of decentralization
considered.
One explanation for the inconsistent findings not previously considered in the Leviathan
literature is the role of the legislature. If increased competition (as measured by the number of
governments) is accompanied by an increasingly large legislature, which in turn is characterized
by a „1/n effect‟ of increased spending, total spending, on net, may increase. Given that the
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relationship between lower level governments and legislative districts varies across jurisdictions,
it is perhaps unsurprising that the Leviathan hypothesis has not be convincingly confirmed or
refuted in the empirical literature. Clearly, a model of the counterbalancing forces of the
Leviathan hypothesis and the Law of 1/n is required to better address these questions. That is the
task undertaken in the next section.

2.3 A Synthesis of the ‘Law of 1/n’ and ‘Leviathan’ Models
A central implication of the Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) and Brennan and Buchanan
(1977, 1978, 1980) models is that total government spending is a function of the number of
relevant jurisdictions (legislative districts in the case of the Law of 1/n and administrative
districts in the case of the Leviathan model) within the government‟s purview. Thus, a basic
model of government spending in state i can be expressed as

Gi  G(ci , ni , X i )

(2.1)

where Gi is total government spending, ci is the number of sub-state governments (such as
counties), ni is the number of seats in the state legislature, and Xi is a collection of other political
and demographic factors which influence spending but are not affected by legislature size or the
number of counties.
As discussed above, the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) model predicts that
intergovernmental competition, a byproduct of fiscal decentralization, will help to constrain
Leviathan government. Further, the degree of fiscal decentralization will increase as the number
of sub-state governments increases, ceteris paribus (Tiebout 1956). In the context of Equation
(2.1), the Leviathan model implies

Gi c i  0
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(2.2)

indicating that total government spending in the state is inversely related to the number of substate governments in the state. Figure 2.1a shows a hypothetical example of this relationship.
Figure 2.1: Leviathan, 1/n, and Government Size

Total Government Expenditure

Figure 2.1a: Leviathan Model

Number of Sub-State Governments

Total Government Expenditure

Figure 2.1b: Law of 1/n Model

Number of Legislative Districts
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The most influential contribution of Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) paper is the
Law of 1/n. The main idea can be summarized as follows. Legislators will endorse spending
programs in their districts up to the point where the marginal benefit of such programs is just
equal to the marginal cost. That is, the optimal (from the point of view of the legislator and his
or her district) level of spending programs is characterized by

b  t 

(2.3)

where b is the benefit associated with the program and t is the cost associated with it. Through
the legislature, however, the costs of local projects can be partially passed off to other districts.
In other words, the district in which the project is being undertaken bares only a share of the
„true‟ cost. Assuming taxes are evenly spread across districts, the optimal (again, from the point
of view of the legislator and his or her district) level of spending in the district becomes

b  (1/ n)t 

(2.4)

where n is the number of legislative districts within the state.
Thus, the Law of 1/n implies that the optimal level of spending for each legislator is
increasing in n. Assuming a traditional logrolling framework where legislators are able to
bargain with one another for district-specific spending programs, total government spending is
also positively related to the number of legislative districts. Specifically, in terms of Equation
(2.1)

Gi ni  0 .

(2.5)

Graphically, the relationship takes a form similar to Figure 2.1b.
In the unified model described by Equation (2.1), government spending is positively
related to the number of legislative districts, but negatively related to the number of sub-state
governments. While this result can be tested straightforwardly as a baseline, the more interesting
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relationship between these counteracting forces requires knowledge of how the two types of
jurisdictions relate to one another. This relationship can be expressed as

ci  i ni

(2.6)

where i is a positive value which represents the relationship between legislative districts and
sub-state governments. It can be interpreted as the number of sub-state governments per
legislative district. A value of i less than one implies counties are outnumbered by legislative
districts, while a value greater than one implies the opposite. This i is exogenously determined
as the number of and relationship between jurisdictions is typically codified in each state‟s
constitution.
Figure 2.2: Number of Counties and Chamber Size (2005)
2.2a: Upper Chamber (Senate)
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2.2b: Lower Chamber (House)
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The value of i varies widely across states. Figure 2.2 plots the number of counties
against the number of seats in the legislator for the 47 contiguous U.S. states featuring bicameral
legislatures. Panel a depicts the relationship for the upper chamber, while panel b shows the
lower chamber. The correlation coefficient across the sample between counties and legislature
size is 0.30 for the upper chamber and 0.10 for the lower chamber. Further, the R-squared value
of the trends depicted in Figure 2.2 is 0.09 for the upper chamber and 0.01 for the lower
chamber. Thus, while the relationship between counties and upper chamber seats is stronger than
the relationship with lower chamber seats, it is still far from constant across states. For example,
Texas is made up for 254 counties but has an upper chamber of only 31 seats ( = 8.19) while
Rhode Island has an upper chamber of 38 seats, and only 5 counties ( = 0.13). It is important to
note that dropping these outliers does not alter the sign or significance of any variables of interest
in the coming empirical results (see Appendix 2.1).
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From a theoretical standpoint, the relationship defined in Equation (2.6) is important
because it indicates the partial derivative in Equation (2.2) does not adequately reflect the total
effect of an increase in the number of sub-state governments on total government spending.
Instead, a total derivative of Equation (2.1) with respect to c is required:

dGi dci  G1  G2 (ni / ci )

(2.7)

with G1  Gi c i and G2  Gi ni , and given X i ci  0 by assumption. Differentiating
Equation (2.6) and substituting into Equation (2.7) yields

dGi dci  Gi c i  Gi ni (1/ i ) .

(2.8)

Given the positive relationship between the number of seats in the legislature and total
government spending described in Equation (2.5), the total effect of and increase in c is less than
the partial derivative Gi c i would suggest. Specifically, the impact of an increase in
intergovernmental competition is lessened by the interaction of the „1/n effect‟ ( Gi ni ), and
the relationship between legislative districts and sub-state governments (i). In other words, the
effect of an increase in the level of intergovernmental competition (as measured by the number
of sub-state governments) is partially offset by associated increases in legislature size (as the
Law of 1/n posits an opposite, positive relationship). The magnitude of this offsetting effect is
determined by the „link‟ between the number of sub-state governments and legislative districts.
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Total Government Expenditure

Figure 2.3: Combined Model for a Hypothetical State with the Number of Legislators
Equal to the Number of Sub-State Governments (=1)

Number of Governments, Legislators
Leviathan Costs

Distributive Costs

Total Costs

Note: For simplicity, the above figure assumes the rate at which an increase in the number of governments or
legislators affects leviathan and distributive costs is the same. The major implication of this assumption is that total
costs are minimized at the point where the two curves intersect. It is important to note that this need not, and will
not, be the case unless this assumption holds.

To more clearly express this idea, Figure 2.3 presents a hypothetical case illustrative of a
state where the number of sub-state governments is identical to the number of legislative
jurisdictions ( =1). This diagram combines both panels of Figure 2.1, with the increases in
government expenditure associated with increased legislature size referred to as „Distributive
Costs‟ and the increases in spending associated with decreased fiscal decentralization referred to
as „Leviathan Costs.‟ That is, Distributive Costs increase as the number of jurisdictions increase
while Leviathan Costs fall as the number of districts increase. This representation is clearly
inspired by Buchanan and Tullock‟s (1962) discussion of the costs associated with various
voting rules.
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Following the approach of Buchanan and Tullock (1962), I define Total Costs as the sum
of Distributive and Leviathan costs. Total Costs are highest at either extreme (zero or some
maximum number of jurisdictions) and minimized at some point in between. At this point where
Total Costs are minimized, the portion of government spending which is determined by the
number of jurisdictions will also be minimized. In the simple case depicted in Figure 2.3, this
happens to be at the intersection of the two costs. This need not be the case, and only occurs
here because the rate at which the costs increase/decrease is identical, by construction.
In this example the Leviathan hypothesis holds for smaller numbers of jurisdictions, with
increases in the number of jurisdictions leading to decreases in government spending. This is
depicted in the figure as the area to the left of the minimum point, and it is here that the partial
derivative Gi ci is large enough (in absolute terms) to overcome the upward pressure of the

Gi ni (1/ i ) term. Given Gi ni  0 , the smaller is λi the larger is this offsetting effect of
the Law of 1/n. If λi is sufficiently small, increases in the number of sub-state governments will
actually lead to increases in total government size as the intergovernmental competition between
administrative districts is more than offset by associated increases in the size of the legislature
and a growing 1/n effect. Stated formally,

(dGi dci )
0.
i
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(2.9)

Figure 2.4: The Effect of  on the Relationship Between the Number of Districts and
Government Expenditure

Total Government Expenditure

2.4a: Hypothetical State with =0.5

Number of Governments, Legislative Districts
Leviathan Costs

Distributive Costs

Total Costs

Total Government Expenditure

2.4b: Hypothetical State with =2

Number of Governments, Legislative Districts
Leviathan Costs

Distributive Costs

Total Costs

Note: For simplicity, the above figure assumes the rate at which an increase in the number of governments or
legislators affects leviathan and distributive costs is the same.
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As the value of λ changes, the curves depicted in Figure 2.3 shift. Figure 2.4 depicts an
example of this. If λ is small (Panel a), this indicates legislative districts outnumber sub-state
governments, and the above model indicates the 1/n effect will start to dominate. This is
depicted in the figure as a leftward shift of the Distributive Costs curve, as well as a leftward
shift of the minimum point on the Total Cost curve, and indicates that the costs associated with
the 1/n effect dominate the cost-savings associated by intergovernmental competition at a much
lower number of jurisdictions than in the baseline case depicted in Figure 2.3. Panel b presents
the opposite scenario, where a high value of  shifts the Leviathan cost curve to the right, and
shows that total costs are minimized at a much higher number of jurisdictions than in the
baseline case. In this high  case, intergovernmental competition overwhelms the 1/n effect,
except at the highest number of jurisdictions.

2.4 Data and Empirical Approach
I test the synthesized model on a panel of U.S. state data. The data span the years 19922005 and cover 47 of the 48 contiguous states. As is standard in the empirical literature on state
legislatures, Nebraska is excluded from the analysis due to its unique unicameral legislature.
Table 2.1 reports summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis.
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Table 2.1: Summary Statistics
48 Contiguous U.S. States (Excluding Nebraska), Years: 1992-2005
Variable Name
Mean Standard Deviation
Counties

63.261

45.301

Upper Chamber Seats

40.167

10.120

Lower Chamber Seats

113.706

54.892

Real State and Local Government Expenditure Per Capita

2909.397

487.066

Real State Total Expenditure Per Capita

2191.507

453.397

Real State General Expenditure Per Capita

1775.847

401.614

Democrat Governor

0.415

0.493

Population Growth Rate (average percentage over 5 years)

1.232

1.036

State Population (millions)

5.768

6.091

Real Federal Aid Per Capita

611.433

210.169

Real Personal Income Per Capita (thousands)

15.430

2.496

Percent Young (Age 5-17)

18.488

1.358

Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates

83.737

4.856

Percent Below Poverty Line

12.511

3.613

Population Density (pop/sq mi)

185.165

248.443

Percent White

84.823

9.937

Calculated Variables

Mean

Standard Deviation

Ratio of Counties/Upper Chamber Seats

1.584

1.278

Ratio of Counties/Lower Chamber Seats

0.589

0.344

Degree of Overlap: Counties and Upper Chamber Seats

-1.971

7.448

Degree of Overlap: Counties and Lower Chamber Seats

-0.287

0.297

Ratio Lower Chamber Seats/Upper Chamber Seats (k)

2.995

2.193

Note: All fiscal variables are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price Index with a base year of 1982-1984.
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The number of counties in a state refers to the number of counties or otherwise-named
equivalent areas. For example, Louisiana is made up of parishes which are functionally
equivalent to counties. This variable is constructed from data available from the National
Association of Counties. I focus on county governments because they are the jurisdiction most
similar to legislative districts in that they completely divide the state‟s area and encompass
smaller local governments. Several northeastern states (Connecticut, Rhode Island, and parts of
Massachusetts) have geographic areas called counties, but do not have county governments.
Dropping these states does not substantially alter the results (see Appendix 2.2). The number of
seats in the upper and lower legislative chambers is taken from various volumes of the Council
of State Government‟s The Book of the States. The ratios of counties to chamber size and lower
to upper chamber size are calculated using these variables.
State and local government expenditure is total state and local expenditure and is taken
from the Census Bureau‟s State and Local Government Finance data. This variable is not
available for the years 2003 or 2001 so these years are excluded from the initial analysis. To
ensure that this exclusion is not driving the results, I also include two additional measures of
state government expenditure which are available for all years 1992-2005. Total state
expenditure is all spending at the state level while state general expenditure excludes utility,
liquor store, and insurance expenditure. These variables are taken from the Census Bureau‟s
Statistical Abstract. All of these variables are adjusted for inflation using the Consumer Price
Index with a base year of 1982-84, and expressed in per capita terms using state population.
Information on the governor‟s political party is taken from The Book of the States. State
population is taken from the Statistical Abstract, and the population growth rate is the average
annual percentage change over the previous five years. Experiments with the use of other
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growth rates, including difference in logs, total changes instead of average annual changes, and
different time periods yielded nearly identical results. Personal income data comes from the
Bureau of Economic Analysis and Federal aid comes from the Statistical Abstract. Both are
adjusted for inflation and population in the same manner discussed above. Finally, the
percentage of the population that is young (between ages 5-17), the percentage of the population
that is white, and state population density all come from the Statistical Abstract while the
percentage of individuals below the poverty line and the percentage of individuals over 18 with
high school diplomas come from the Census Bureau‟s Current Population Survey data.
To test the effects of counties and legislative chamber size on government spending, I
employ the following fixed effect panel model

Git    1nitU  2 nitL  3cit  X it  t  i   it

(2.10)

where Git represents government expenditure, nitU represents the number of seats in the upper
chamber, nitL represents the number of seats in the lower chamber, and cit represents the number
of counties in state i during year t. Xit is a matrix of demographic and political factors which
may affect government spending, and t and φi represent year and census region fixed effects.
The variables which enter the Xit matrix include an indicator for the governor‟s political party,
the state‟s population growth rate, the level of population, real per capita federal aid to the state,
real per capita state personal income, population density, and variables representing the
percentages of the population that is age 15-17, age 18+ with a high school education, living
below the poverty line, and white. There is not enough variation in chamber sizes or the number
of counties within states during this time frame to allow the use of state fixed effects, so census
region effects are used. Finally, εit is an error term. As noted by Chen and Malhotra (2007),
correlation of the error terms within cross-sections is a major concern in these types of studies. I
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follow their approach in using panel-corrected standard errors [see Beck and Katz (1995)] in my
analysis.
Equation (2.10) can be estimated without the chamber size variables to test the traditional
Leviathan hypothesis. Similarly, the county variable can be dropped to test a 1/n model. If the
empirical results support the above theoretical model, the coefficient estimates on these variables
of interest should not be affected by including both types of jurisdictions in the same regression.
In other words, when Equation (2.10) is estimated with both the chamber size and county
variables included, theory would predict a negative and significant coefficient on the number of
counties with a positive and significant coefficient on the upper chamber size. Past empirical
studies have typically found either an insignificant or negative coefficient on the lower chamber
size variable.
The parabola-type relationship depicted in Figure 2.3 can also be tested for empirically
by modifying Equation (2.10) to include squared terms. This specification will serve as a
second-order linear approximation and has been used in a variety of empirical contexts such as
tests of the Laffer curve [see for example, Sobel (1999), Garrett (2001) and Crowley and Sobel
(2010)]. When the squared terms are included, the model becomes

Git    1nitU  2 nitL  3cit  4 (nitU ) 2  5 (nitL ) 2  6 (cit ) 2  X it  t  i   it . (2.11)
Results consistent with the parabola relationship will be characterized by negative first-order
coefficients and positive coefficients on the squared term, indicating initial levels of
decentralization reduce the size of government while the 1/n effect increases spending at higher
levels of decentralization.
While the previous empirical specifications are useful for testing the partial effects of
chamber size and the number of counties, they do not adequately model the mechanism through
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which the counterbalancing forces occur. To test the effect of the relationship between the
number of counties and legislature size on the size of government, I include several additional
specifications. First, I include variables which interact the number of counties with the chamber
sizes. These provide a test of the change of the marginal effect of an increase in counties or
chamber sizes due to an increase in the other type of district. The empirical model then becomes

Git    1nitU  2 nitL  3 (nitU  cit )  4 (nitL  cit )  X it  t   it

(2.12)

for chamber sizes and can be modified to look at the effects on counties as well. Either the
chamber size variables or the counties variable must be dropped in order to get a meaningful
interpretation of the marginal effect represented by the interaction term.
In the above model, i 

ci
, so i  1 when ci = ni, a situation analogous to the one
ni

depicted in Figure 2.3. Thus, one possible measure of the degree of „overlap‟ between counties
and legislative districts is the squared „distance‟ between it and 1, (1  it ) 2 . This measure
treats positive and negative deviations from ci = ni (that is, cases where ci > ni and ci < ni)
identically.
Empirically, I define this measure of the degree of overlap of chamber size and the
number of counties for each as

 c
   1  Uit
 nit
U
it





2

(2.13a)

for the upper chamber U and

 c 
   1  itL 
 nit 
L
it
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2

(2.13b)

for the lower chamber L. This measure is the squared distance between  and 1 multiplied by -1.
Multiplying by -1 allows for ease in interpretation by changing the measure of distance from  =
1 to a measure of nearness. Thus, I interpret  as a measure of the degree of overlap between
legislative districts and counties, and use it as an interaction term in specifications analogous to
the unified model described by Equation (2.10). If the linkage between counties and legislature
size is truly important in determining the degree to which the Law of 1/n impacts government
size, these interaction variables should be statistically significant.
Finally, in the above theoretical model, the relationship between counties and legislative
chamber size, i, is responsible for determining the degree to which intergovernmental
competition lessens the 1/n effect of an increase in chamber size. Including a it for the upper
and lower chambers in Equation (2.10) yields

Git    1nitU  2 nitL  3cit  4Uit  5itL  X it  t   it .

(2.14)

Empirically, I use a variety of measures of  it. First, I test a specification which includes both
values of  it without the county and legislature size variables. These variables‟ coefficients are
expected to take negative signs indicating that larger  it values are associated with lower
government spending as intergovernmental competition overwhelms the 1/n effect. Next, I
include indicator variables which take a value of 1 if the associated it is greater than 1. In other
words, the number of counties exceeds the number of seats in the legislature. In this
specification, the coefficient on the it terms is expected to take a negative sign indicating lower
spending in states where a high level of intergovernmental competition overpowers the 1/n
effect.
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As a final test, I estimate a specification which examines Equation (2.8) directly by
including interaction terms between the legislative chamber size variables with the variable 1/ it
such that

Git    1nitU  2 nitL  3cit  4 [nitU  (1/ Uit )]  5 [nitL  (1/ itL )]  X it  t   it . (2.15)
Here, the coefficients on the interaction terms are expected to take positive signs since the above
model predicts that the 1/n effect is larger the smaller is the value of  (and thus the larger is the
value of 1/).

2.5 Results and Discussion
Before examining the effect of intergovernmental competition on the Law of 1/n, I conduct an
initial analysis to test both models separately. This serves two functions: first, it checks the
robustness of previous empirical studies by using different data and second, it ensures that the
primary findings are not an artifact of any characteristics of these data which are inconsistent
with that used by others. Table 2.2 presents these baseline results.
Column 1 presents results from a test of the 1/n hypothesis. Consistent with the previous
theoretical and empirical literature, the relationship between the number of seats in the upper
chamber and government spending is positive and statistically significant. Also consistent with
previous empirical work, the size of the lower chamber is negatively related to government
spending. The specification presented in column 2 tests the Leviathan fiscal decentralization
hypothesis. Specifically, the results show a negative relationship between government size and
the number of counties in a state, again consistent with both theory and past empirical evidence.
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Table 2.2: Testing the Law of 1/n and Leviathan Theories
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita State and Local Expenditure
Specification:
1
2
3
Upper Chamber Seats
Lower Chamber Seats

6.415***
(0.888)
-2.170***
(0.192)
-1.296***
(0.286)

7.689***
(0.776)
-2.077***
(0.178)
-1.636***
(0.197)

25.839*
(14.796)
-44.914***
(14.382)
7.841***
(1.580)
0.885***
(0.136)
107.535***
(8.244)
5.490
(7.140)
10.225***
(3.445)
-3.181
(4.372)
-0.360***
(0.051)
-2.021
(1.259)

22.316
(15.847)
-44.596***
(14.306)
12.294***
(1.885)
0.961***
(0.139)
92.184***
(7.187)
-3.766
(7.626)
13.461***
(3.594)
4.679
(4.129)
-0.082*
(0.043)
-3.030***
(0.982)

33.030**
(14.925)
-34.120**
(13.717)
12.972***
(1.636)
0.857***
(0.129)
108.621***
(8.663)
16.426**
(8.013)
9.424***
(3.370)
-0.838
(4.137)
-0.414***
(0.050)
-0.058
(1.104)

-68.286***
(6.887)
-1.418**
(0.676)
-3.230***
(0.738)
0.876***
(0.072)
-0.002
(0.002)
0.008***
(0.003)
45.751***
(14.542)
-122.799***
(16.822)
12.948***
(1.961)
0.624***
(0.093)
81.846***
(7.580)
-3.860
(8.371)
10.594***
(3.463)
3.026
(4.044)
-0.240***
(0.054)
-1.860*
(1.126)

564
0.799

564
0.770

564
0.807

564
0.844

Counties
Upper Chamber Seats Squared
Lower Chamber Seats Squared
Counties Squared
Democrat Governor
Population Growth Rate
Population (millions)
Real Per Capita Federal Aid
Real Per Capita Personal Income
Percent Young (Age 5-17)
Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates
Percent Below Poverty Line
Population Density (pop/sq mi)
Percent White
Number of Observations
R-Squared

4

Note: All models include year and census region fixed effects. Constant and fixed effect coefficient estimates not
shown. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

Column 3 presents results for a specification which includes both upper and lower
legislative chamber size and the number of county governments. As discussed above, the
correlation between chamber sizes and the number of counties is low, indicating models which
include only chamber size or the number of governments largely ignore the effects of the
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excluded variable. The sign and significance of both chamber size variables as well as the
number of counties variable are consistent with the previous, separated specifications. The
magnitudes for each coefficient are also very similar to the previous specifications. This result
lends credence to the joint analysis of the counteracting forces of the Law of 1/n and „Leviathan‟
models: the size of the upper legislative chamber is positively related to the size of government
while the number of county governments is negatively related to government size.
Column 4 presents results for a specification which analyzes the second-order effects of
increases in chamber size and the number of counties. Specifically, this specification is identical
to column 3 but for the addition of squared upper and lower chamber sizes and a squared county
variable. This model tests for the relationship modeled in Figure 2.3. While the results for the
lower chamber are vague, upper chamber size and the number of counties clearly exhibit the
expected parabola shape. The number of both types of jurisdiction is negatively related to
government spending, but the second-order effect is positive. These results are consistent with
the relationship shown in Figure 2.3, and also provide evidence that decentralization constrains
government up to some point, after which it may lead to increases in expenditure.4
While the previous results are noteworthy in that they empirically identify the concurrent
and counterbalancing effects of chamber size and the number of governments, they do not
adequately measure the interplay of the effects. In other words, the previous specifications treat
the effects as behaving independently while the true power of the above theoretical analysis lies
in the interaction of the two effects. Specifically, the theory outlined above describes
4

The estimates from Column 4 of Table 2.2 can be used to calculate the level of decentralization which minimizes
government spending. By substituting n  (1 )c into Equation (2.11) and differentiating with respect to c, the
expenditure-minimizing level of decentralization (as a function of ) can be found. 38% of states have a number of
counties above this „optimal‟ number, while 62% of states have a number of counties below this expenditureminimizing number. Thus, while the majority of states in the sample could expect decreases in spending by
engaging in further decentralization, many may actually experience increases in expenditure. The average (across
all states) expenditure-minimizing number of counties is 64.
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intergovernmental competition as having a limiting effect on the Law of 1/n which is magnified
by the relationship between the number of legislators and the number of sub-state governments,
referred to above as λ. Table 2.3 presents results from specifications designed to test this
interaction of effects.
Table 2.3: Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita State and Local Expenditure
Specification:
1
2
3
4
Upper Chamber Seats
Lower Chamber Seats

10.846***
(1.244)
-2.177***
(0.205)

Counties
Upper Chamber Seats x Counties
Lower Chamber Seats x Counties

-0.049***
(0.010)
0.004**
(0.002)

-4.629***
(0.762)
0.083***
(0.006)
-0.000
(0.004)

Upper Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap

9.590***
(0.802)
1.307***
(0.502)
-7.238***
(0.644)

5

6

8.708***
(0.738)
-2.234***
(0.172)
-1.280***
(0.265)

7.738***
(0.983)
-2.652***
(0.334)
-1.355***
(0.209)

-0.786***
(0.078)
3.689***
(0.570)

Lower Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap
Upper Chamber 

-55.171***
(6.534)
-49.995
(50.000)

Lower Chamber 
Upper Chamber  > 1 (c>nU)

-155.117***
(27.435)
74.135**
(29.713)

Lower Chamber  > 1 (c>nL)
Upper Chamber Seats x 1/

32.529**
(15.131)
-32.799**
(14.184)
10.623***
(1.591)
0.861***
(0.136)
110.833***
(8.889)
12.622
(7.887)
9.308***
(3.506)
-2.619
(4.210)
-0.444***
(0.060)
-0.821
(1.217)

16.204
(16.990)
-40.237***
(15.287)
13.485***
(1.777)
0.958***
(0.141)
90.853***
(7.250)
2.094
(7.563)
11.768***
(3.366)
4.691
(4.177)
-0.034
(0.042)
0.312
(1.097

36.998**
(15.346)
-45.074***
(13.357)
11.800***
(1.704)
0.779***
(0.124)
113.225***
(9.029)
12.053
(8.808)
7.345**
(3.547)
-2.227
(3.982)
-0.500***
(0.055)
0.732
(1.308)

20.311
(16.471)
-39.764***
(14.982)
14.313***
(1.656)
0.952***
(0.138)
93.288***
(7.415)
1.897
(7.885)
12.430***
(3.458)
5.657
(4.060)
-0.087**
(0.043)
-1.100
(0.966)

31.448**
(14.397)
-56.985***
(14.366)
14.951***
(1.776)
0.782***
(0.121)
104.973***
(8.707)
4.012
(8.963)
9.481***
(3.310)
0.300
(4.183)
-0.508***
(0.050)
-0.423
(1.070)

0.439**
(0.195)
0.0126
(0.008)
35.739**
(15.098)
-40.075***
(13.218)
14.248***
(1.873)
0.829***
(0.124)
110.599***
(8.786)
15.886*
(8.261)
11.502***
(3.716)
0.307
(4.090)
-0.531***
(0.065)
-0.982
(1.135)

564
0.803

564
0.785

564
0.815

564
0.777

564
0.815

564
0.809

Lower Chamber Seats x 1/
Democrat Governor
Population Growth Rate
Population (millions)
Real Per Capita Federal Aid
Real Per Capita Personal Income
Percent Young (Age 5-17)
Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates
Percent Below Poverty Line
Population Density (pop/sq mi)
Percent White
Number of Observations
R-Squared

Note: All models include year and census region fixed effects. Constant and fixed effect coefficient estimates not
shown. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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The first two columns of Table 2.3 are analogous to columns 1 and 2 in Table 2.2 with
two additional interaction terms included. These terms interact the number of counties with
upper and lower chamber sizes. The results in column 1 indicate that while the size of the upper
chamber is positively related to government spending, this effect is lessened at the margin by
increases in the number of county governments since the interaction term is negative and
statistically significant. Similarly, column 2 shows that while the number of counties in a state is
negatively related to the size of total government, the effect is lessened by an increase in the size
of the upper chamber, since the interaction term is positive and statistically significant. These
results provide evidence of the counterbalancing effects of the Law of 1/n and Leviathan
theories.
Column 3 incorporates the overlap measure described above. Again, this measure
increases as the ratio it 

cit
approaches 1. First and foremost, the chamber size and county
nit

variables retain their previous signs and statistical significance, but the lower chamber is now
positive as well, providing the first evidence of a „1/n effect‟ in that chamber. The effect of an
increase in upper chamber size on government spending decreases, however, as the degree of
overlap increases. As before, this is evidenced by the negative and significant interaction term.
In other words, while the Law of 1/n holds for the upper chamber in these data, the effect is
lessened by the degree to which an increase in the number of legislators corresponds to an
increase in the number of counties and thus the level of intergovernmental competition. The
interaction between overlap and lower chamber size is positive and significant, suggesting that as
lower chamber size approaches the number of counties spending increases further. This result is
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puzzling, but again unsurprising given the similarly unexpected lower chamber results in
previous studies.
The fourth column of Table 2.3 presents the results of the specification which includes
the  values for the upper and lower chambers. The upper chamber variable has a coefficient
that is negative and statistically significant, indicating that government spending is negatively
related to the size of . The lower chamber  variable is negative but insignificant. This result is
consistent with the model outlined above: the higher is the value of , the fewer legislativedistricts-per-county in a state, which likely means the downward pressure on spending associated
with intergovernmental competition is overwhelming the 1/n effect. Column 5 shows the results
of a specification which includes variables indicating whether the value of λ is greater than one
for the upper and lower chambers. As shown above, this occurs whenever the number of
counties in the state exceeds the number of seats in the legislative chamber. First, the chamber
size and county variables retain their sign and significance. The Upper Chamber λ>1 variable is
negative and statistically significant, which implies that states with more counties than upper
chamber districts are characterized by lower spending. Likewise, as the number of legislative
districts relative to counties rises so too will spending.
The final column of Table 2.3 tests Equation (2.8) directly by including interaction terms
of legislative chamber size with 1/. These results (for the upper chamber) are again consistent
with the model, as the chamber size and county variables retain their sign and significance, and
the marginal effect of an increase in upper chamber size increases as the value of 1/ increases
(in other words,  decreases). The smaller is , the stronger is the 1/n effect.

33

Table 2.4: Ranking of States by Upper Chamber , 2005
Largest Upper Chamber  Values
State

Texas
Missouri
Kentucky
Tennessee
Georgia
Ohio
Kansas
Virginia
Michigan
Wisconsin

8.194
3.353
3.158
2.879
2.839
2.667
2.625
2.375
2.184
2.182

Smallest Upper Chamber  Values
State

New Jersey
Maryland
Arizona
Vermont
Maine
New Hampshire
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Delaware
Rhode Island

0.525
0.511
0.500
0.467
0.457
0.417
0.350
0.222
0.143
0.132

Table 2.4 presents the ten states with the largest and smallest values of  for the upper
legislative chamber. The above model predicts, and the empirical analysis supports, that the
larger is  the more likely the Leviathan hypothesis is to hold, as the 1/n effect is overwhelmed
by increases in intergovernmental competition. Thus, the states with relatively high  values can
be expected to see decreases in government size as a result of intergovernmental competition,
assuming the relationship between counties and legislative districts remains constant.
Conversely, the states with the smallest  values can be expected to see increases in government
spending following increased decentralization as the associated growth of the legislature (and
related 1/n effect) more than offsets the increased intergovernmental competition (again,
assuming the ratio of sub-state governments to legislative districts remains unchanged).
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The logic here follows from the idea that the effect of intergovernmental competition is
lessened by the Law of 1/n, and the extent to which it is lessened depends on how closely
legislative districts are linked to administrative districts. If the link is relatively strong, a state
can have a relatively centralized government and still feature less government spending than a
state with comparatively little overlap between the types of jurisdictions. The mechanism which
affects this phenomenon is the Law of 1/n within the legislature—if increases in the number of
sub-state governments correspond to increases in legislature size, government spending may not
decline as predicted by the Leviathan hypothesis.

2.6 Robustness Check
The analysis discussed above was conducted on selected years in the period 1992-2005 using
total state and local expenditure. Numerous other dependent variables have been used in both
the 1/n and Leviathan literatures. I estimate my primary results again using two of these
alternative measures of government size, namely total state expenditure and total state general
expenditure. Both of these measures do not contain local spending, and the chief difference
between general and total state expenditure is that total expenditure includes spending on
utilities, liquor stores, and insurance while general expenditure does not. Further, these data are
available for all years, 1992-2005, allowing for an expansion in the number of observations.
Table 2.5 presents results of the primary specifications described above now estimated on
total state expenditure. Column 1 is analogous to column 3 in Table 2.2. This specification
includes both the sizes of the upper and lower chambers as well as the number of county
governments in the state. The coefficients retain their sign and significance, as well as similar
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magnitudes. The same is true for the upper chamber and county variables of interest in column
2, which includes the squared chamber size and county variables.
Table 2.5: Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n: Total State Expenditure
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Total State Expenditure
Specification:
1
2
3
4
Upper Chamber Seats
Lower Chamber Seats
Counties

4.958***
(0.466)
-1.854***
(0.157)
-2.724***
(0.267)

Upper Chamber Seats Squared
Lower Chamber Seats Squared
Counites Squared

-76.191***
(8.517)
1.093**
(0.548)
-5.973***
(0.636)
0.929***
(0.093)
-0.007***
(0.001)
0.014***
(0.002)

Upper Chamber Seats x Counties

9.402***
(1.049)
-1.902***
(0.180)
-5.954***
(0.662)

-0.068***
(0.010)
0.002
(0.002)

Lower Chamber Seats x Counties

5

0.056***
(0.004)
0.007**
(0.003)

Upper Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap

-0.784***
(0.068)
2.639***
(0.466)

Lower Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap
Upper Chamber 

56.344***
(20.978)
-103.643***
(14.813)
6.477***
(1.746)
0.813***
(0.106)
51.588***
(6.262)
12.975
(8.175)
0.102
(3.414)
-2.343
(3.914)
-0.118**
(0.057)
2.608***
(0.869)

71.777***
(19.727)
-199.507***
(23.582)
6.422***
(2.090)
0.549***
(0.072)
24.225***
(5.868)
-9.953
(7.980)
-0.071
(3.503)
1.584
(3.759)
0.056
(0.044)
0.770
(0.801)

58.761**
(23.040)
-97.794***
(15.334)
3.561**
(6.534)
0.827***
(0.116)
53.573***
(6.534)
8.485
(7.589)
0.160
(3.616)
-5.128
(4.161)
-0.154**
(0.060)
1.360
(0.847)

38.716**
(16.753)
-108.798***
(15.712)
6.887***
(1.860)
0.897***
(0.112)
38.255***
(5.425)
0.132
(7.187)
0.789
(3.306)
2.376
(3.927)
0.203***
(0.047)
3.627***
(0.978)

65.598***
(21.983)
-117.754***
(14.835)
5.704***
(1.847)
0.711***
(0.100)
52.725***
(7.012)
4.517
(8.511)
-1.505
(3.660)
-3.788
(3.777)
-0.230***
(0.057)
2.528**
(1.021)

-35.830***
(6.908)
-298.214***
(37.548)
38.386**
(16.181)
-112.290***
(15.347)
6.813***
(1.785)
0.881***
(0.108)
41.043***
(5.550)
-2.654
(7.184)
0.232
(3.370)
2.929
(3.808)
0.166***
(0.047)
3.106***
(0.901)

658
0.744

658
0.795

658
0.735

658
0.727

658
0.756

658
0.729

Lower Chamber 
Democrat Governor
Population Growth Rate
Population (millions)
Real Per Capita Federal Aid
Real Per Capita Personal Income
Percent Young (Age 5-17)
Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates
Percent Below Poverty Line
Population Density (pop/sq mi)
Percent White
Number of Observations
R-Squared

6

8.047***
(0.512)
0.540
(0.427)
-7.947***
(0.551)

Note: All models include year and census region fixed effects. Constant and fixed effect coefficient estimates not
shown. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

Columns 3 and 4 are analogous to columns 1 and 2 of Table 2.3. These specifications
contain interaction terms of the chamber size variables with the number of counties. As before,
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all variables of interest retain sign and significance, as well as similar magnitudes. Regardless of
the expenditure measure used, increases in the number of counties, ceteris paribus, decrease the
positive effect of increases in upper chamber size. Likewise, an increase in upper chamber size
partially counteracts the negative effect of increased intergovernmental competition.
Column 5 presents the results of a specification which includes an interaction between
chamber sizes and the degree of overlap variable. Once again, most variables retain sign,
statistical significance, and similar magnitudes. The clear relationship between upper chamber
size‟s impact on expenditure and the degree of overlap with county governments remains with
the alternative expenditure measure. Finally, column 6 includes the  values for the upper and
lower chamber. As before, higher values of  correspond to lower government spending,
consistent with the model. Interestingly, the lower chamber  variable is now negative and
statistically significant as well.
Table 2.6 presents the same primary specifications using the general expenditure
dependent variable. Again, all variables of interest retain their sign and significance as well as
similar magnitudes. The results presented in the previous section are robust to alternative
measures of government size. Specifically, regardless of the definition of „government
spending‟ considered, the size of the upper legislative chamber is positively correlated with
government size while the number of counties is negatively related. Further, the parabola
relationship depicted in Figure 2.3 can be found for all measures of spending and an increase in
the number of jurisdictions of the other type decreases the marginal effect predicted by the
Leviathan hypothesis and Law of 1/n. Finally, the effect of an increase in legislature size is
diminished when the degree of overlap between districts and counties is high, and the larger is
the value of  the smaller is the level of government spending.
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Table 2.6: Intergovernmental Competition and the Law of 1/n: State General Expenditure
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Total State General Expenditure
Specification:
1
2
3
4
Upper Chamber Seats
Lower Chamber Seats
Counties

3.944***
(0.515)
-1.492***
(0.138)
-1.969***
(0.221)

Upper Chamber Seats Squared
Lower Chamber Seats Squared
Counties Squared

-44.004***
(6.757)
1.078*
(0.604)
-5.856***
(0.563)
0.555***
(0.075)
-0.006***
(0.001)
0.016***
(0.002)

Upper Chamber Seats x Counties

8.062***
(0.975)
-1.605***
(0.169)
-5.039***
(0.589)

-0.062***
(0.111)
0.005*
(0.003)

Lower Chamber Seats x Counties

5
6.888***
(0.458)
-0.525
(0.423)
-5.322***
(0.590)

0.043***
(0.006)
0.009***
(0.003)

Upper Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap

-0.542***
(0.071)
1.093**
(0.495)

Lower Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap
Upper Chamber 

34.021*
(18.753)
-68.054***
(12.360)
-0.296
(2.799)
0.718***
(0.107)
43.470***
(6.608)
26.122***
(9.159)
1.585
(3.702)
-2.051
(4.324)
-0.097**
(0.043)
4.153***
(1.068)

46.445***
(17.030)
-133.016***
(17.519)
-0.058
(2.914)
0.519***
(0.087)
25.331***
(6.270)
7.442
(9.193)
1.099
(3.809)
0.409
(4.228)
-0.030
(0.034)
2.707***
(1.054)

35.731*
(20.554)
-64.869***
(13.048)
-2.720
(2.721)
0.720***
(0.116)
45.850***
(6.596)
22.308**
(8.976)
1.478
(3.814)
-4.292
(4.493)
-0.138***
(0.048)
3.275***
(1.088)

18.749
(14.393)
-74.409***
(13.428)
0.084
(2.832)
0.780***
(0.113)
32.857***
(5.848)
15.201*
(8.454)
2.036
(4.394)
2.067
(4.394)
0.164***
(0.035)
5.165***
(1.141)

43.097**
(18.952)
-80.189***
(12.756)
-0.596
(2.791)
0.632***
(0.105)
42.001***
(7.235)
17.229*
(9.527)
0.875
(3.837)
-2.930
(4.274)
-0.193***
(0.043)
3.481***
(1.056)

-23.973***
(8.549)
-241.434***
(36.833)
20.261
(14.008)
-74.895***
(12.985)
0.259
(2.818)
0.770***
(0.110)
35.049***
(5.932)
13.941
(8.529)
1.710
(3.640)
2.370
(4.297)
0.126***
(0.034)
4.556***
(1.048)

658
0.879

658
0.896

658
0.866

658
0.872

658
0.884

658
0.873

Lower Chamber 
Democrat Governor
Population Growth Rate
Population (millions)
Real Per Capita Federal Aid
Real Per Capita Personal Income
Percent Young (Age 5-17)
Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates
Percent Below Poverty Line
Population Density (pop/sq mi)
Percent White
Number of Observations
R-Squared

6

Note: All models include year and census region fixed effects. Constant and fixed effect coefficient estimates not
shown. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.

In a recent contribution, Chen and Malhotra (2007) provide a theoretical extension of the
original Weingast, Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) model which specifically models bicameral
legislatures. The major implication of the model is that the ratio of lower to upper chamber size,
which the authors refer to as „k,‟ has a negative effect on expenditure while upper chamber size,
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„n,‟ retains its traditional positive effect. In empirical practice, the „k‟ ratio is used in place of
the lower chamber size variable used in previous studies. To control for this effect, I again
estimate my primary results, here using „k‟ instead of lower chamber size.
Table 2.7: Including the Chen and Malhotra (2007) ‘k’ Ratio
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita State and Local Expenditure
Specification:
1
2
3

4

4.044***
(0.960)
-44.974***
(4.360)
-1.853***
(0.213)

6.393***
(0.901)
-46.504***
(4.382)
-3.613***
(0.489)

Upper Chamber Seats
Ratio Lower/Upper Chamber Seats 'k'
Counties
Upper Chamber Seats Squared
Counties Squared

-73.662***
(6.715)
-54.336***
(3.968)
-3.484***
(0.734)
0.896***
(0.072)
0.009***
(0.002)

Upper Chamber Seats x Counties

6.431
(0.998)
-44.282***
(4.431)

-0.037***
(0.004)

Upper Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap
Democrat Governor
Population Growth Rate
Population (millions)
Real Per Capita Federal Aid
Real Per Capita Personal Income
Percent Young (Age 5-17)
Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates
Percent Below Poverty Line
Population Density (pop/sq mi)
Percent White
Number of Observations
R-Squared

31.222**
(14.885)
-31.200**
(13.999)
12.900***
(1.635)
0.875***
(0.132)
107.689***
(8.704)
17.322**
(8.178)
8.894***
(3.366)
-0.202
(4.104)
-0.364***
(0.050)
0.719
(1.206)

45.181***
(14.614)
-125.321***
(17.071)
13.044***
(1.967)
0.620***
(0.921)
81.276***
(7.469)
-2.646
(8.426)
10.321***
(3.308)
3.760
(4.018)
-0.221***
(0.053)
-1.163
(1.208)

31.149**
(14.964)
-27.952*
(14.340)
10.733***
(1.514)
0.891***
(0.137)
108.578***
(8.695)
13.709*
(8.000)
9.008***
(3.462)
-1.876
(4.193)
-0.372***
(0.054)
-0.187
(1.264)

-0.320***
(0.064)
39.010***
(15.025)
-40.632***
(13.608)
12.889***
(1.656)
0.811***
(0.128)
105.269***
(8.473)
9.857
(8.644)
8.677***
(3.322)
-0.563
(4.014)
-0.441***
(0.054)
-0.134
(1.179)

564
0.803

564
0.844

564
0.798

564
0.808

Note: All models include year and census region fixed effects. Constant and fixed effect coefficient estimates not
shown. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Table 2.7 presents these results. Column 1 shows that the variables of interest in the
combined chamber size and counties model retain their sign and significance, as well as similar
magnitudes. Further, the „k‟ ratio is negative and statistically significant as is found by Chen and
Malhotra (2007). The magnitudes in column 1 are also similar to the findings in their study.
Column 2 indicates the second-order relationships from previous specifications are robust to this
alternative specification as well. The same can be said for the specification which includes the
interaction of counties with upper chamber seats, shown in column 3. Again, the „k‟ ratio is
negative and significant in these specifications as well. Finally, the last column, which shows
the results of the specification including the degree of overlap variable, also indicates that the
inclusion of the „k‟ ratio does not significantly alter the results.
The results presented in Tables 2.5, 2.6, and 2.7 speak to the robustness of the empirical
investigation‟s findings. Specifically, upper chamber size is positively related to several
measures of state government spending. Likewise, the number of county governments is
negatively related to spending, regardless of how it is measured. The more complex
relationships detailed above also hold under a variety of dependent variables. Finally, the
inclusion of the „k‟ ratio in lieu of lower chamber size does not alter the results.

2.7 Conclusion
The influential work of Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen (1981) predicts a positive relationship
between legislative chamber size and government spending due to decreasing district tax shares
and the associated increase in inefficient projects. At the same time, the work of Brennan and
Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) posits a negative relationship between the number of sub-state
governments and total spending due to increases in intergovernmental competition. While
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extensive work has been devoted to testing these theories independently, a model unifying these
effects has not yet been developed. This paper presents and empirically tests such a model.
The extent to which an increase in the level of intergovernmental competition affects
government spending is a function of the relationship between legislature size and the number of
sub-state governments. If an increase in the number of sub-state governments (and associated
increase in the level of competition) implies an increase in the number of legislative districts as
well (in other words, the link between legislature size and the number of counties is strong) the
effect predicted by the Leviathan hypothesis is lessened. This lessening effect is caused by the
positive relationship between legislature size and total spending. In the extreme case where the
link is very strong, increases in the number of sub-state governments may actually lead to
increases in spending as the associated increase in legislature size more than offsets the effects of
intergovernmental competition.
The empirical findings support the unified model. While the effect of an increase in
intergovernmental competition is negative when tested separately, once the relationship between
legislature size and the number of county governments is included the effect is weakened.
Specifically, I employ a variety of additional empirical definitions for the relationship, ranging
from an interaction between seats in the upper chamber with the number of counties to a degree
of overlap measure. In each case, the predicted weakening of the Leviathan hypothesis is clearly
evident. The results are also robust to several different measures of spending and the inclusion
of the Chen and Malhotra (2007) „k‟ ratio.
These results have serious implications for the study the effects of legislature size and
fiscal decentralization on government size. By ignoring the interplay between the Law of 1/n
and intergovernmental competition effects, previous studies have likely overestimated the
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positive relationship between legislature size and spending as well as underestimated the
negative relationship between the number of sub-state governments and total expenditure. At the
very least, the present paper provides a plausible explanation for the rather inconsistent results of
previous tests of the Leviathan hypothesis. Further, the above results and discussion confirm the
uniqueness of the lower legislative chamber found by previous studies indicating the need for
further research on bicameralism in the vein of Chen and Malhotra (2007).
Finally, this paper has important policy implications. Any attempts to reform
government which target total expenditure need to consider the effects of the structure of both
the lower level governments as well as the legislature. While fiscal decentralization may be an
“objective for constitutional reform,” as in Buchanan (1995), it may not necessarily lead to
smaller government in cases where it corresponds to a larger upper chamber in the legislature.
At the same time, the increased distributive politics which characterize larger legislatures may
not be as problematic in states exhibiting a high degree of intergovernmental competition.
Future work on „optimal‟ government structure will do well to consider the counterbalancing
effects of the Law of 1/n and Leviathan theories.
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Chapter 3
Does Fiscal Decentralization Constrain Leviathan?
New Evidence from Local Property Tax Competition
3.1 Introduction
The Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) Leviathan model of government has become a
mainstay of the public economics literature. In this framework, the Leviathan government‟s
objective is to maximize its size. In the absence of any constraints, a Leviathan government will
set tax rates that maximize tax revenue, and end up operating at the peak of the Laffer curve.
According to the model, there are only two possible constraints on the Leviathan behavior of
governments—constitutional constraints and the presence of intergovernmental competition from
competing jurisdictions.5
The related fiscal federalism/fiscal decentralization literature spins out of the Tiebout
(1956) theory of intergovernmental competition. Oates (1999) describes fiscal federalism as a
framework assigning different functions to the different levels of government, usually on the
basis of the extent of external (or spillover) costs and benefits. While federalism describes a
hierarchy of governments, its byproduct is a large number of competitive jurisdictions at lower
levels. It is this „horizontal‟ competition on which studies of decentralization and government
size are based. As the level of competition between governmental units increases the constraint
on Leviathan-type behavior grows stronger. In the extreme, competition between governments
may approximate market outcomes (Dowding, John, and Biggs 1994).

5

It is worth explicitly noting that Brennan and Buchanan (1980) use their model to derive the precise constitutional
constraints that best limit the Leviathan power of government. Also, see Holcombe (1994) for an explanation of
how constitutions serve as a substitute for mobility in constraining the Leviathan behavior of governments.
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A large body of literature exists that attempts to empirically examine whether the
presence of intergovernmental competition constrains the Leviathan behavior of governments.
This literature has used the number of local governments as a measure of fiscal decentralization,
and the level of taxes or spending per capita, or as a percent of economic activity, as a measure
of government size. This previous literature has examined local, state, and international data and
has found mixed results. For example, Oates (1972, 1985, 1989), Forbes and Zampelli (1989),
Anderson and van den Berg (1998), and Heil (1991) all find little or no impact of a larger
number of governments on government size, while Zax (1989), Joulfaian and Marlow (1990),
Nelson (1986, 1987), Eberts and Gronberg (1988), Grossman (1989), Marlow (1988),
Shadbegian (1999), and Stansel (2006) all support the conclusion that fiscal decentralization
constrains Leviathan.6 Finally, Cassette and Paty (forthcoming) show that decentralization
decreases spending at the federal level while increasing expenditure at the sub-national level
using data from the European Union.
In this literature, several recurrent problems have been identified that may explain the
mixed nature of the findings across studies. First, both constitutional constraints and competition
tend to constrain the Leviathan behavior of governments and none of these studies attempt to
explicitly control for the different constitutional constraints faced by the governments in their
samples. This is a significant problem for studies done using international, cross-country data as
constitutions differ significantly across countries, and is also a problem (although of a lesser
extent) for studies using cross-sections of U.S. states or Canadian provinces who also face
6

In related studies using international data, Arikan (2004) finds that a larger number of governmental units lowers
government corruption and Faguet (2004) finds that decentralization increases responsiveness to local demand for
public services. Akai and Sakata (2002) find that decentralization increases the rate of economic growth, and
Brueckner (2006) presents a theoretical model in which fiscal federalism leads to increased investment in human
capital. Thus, these studies all implicitly support the Leviathan model in which decentralization constrains
government. Dye and McGuire (1997) provide further indirect evidence in support of the Leviathan model by
analyzing changes in fiscal behavior under property tax limits.
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different constitutional constraints. A second problem faced in previous studies is the use of
measures of total government size to measure the level of competition or constraints on the
government rather than data on specific tax rates and how they compare across jurisdictions or
levels of government.
The third and final problem identified in this literature, the largest of the three, is that the
results for single-purpose governmental units (like school districts or special governmental units
offering only fire or water service) seem to be fundamentally different than the results found
using traditional (multi-purpose) jurisdictions such as city, county, or national governments. For
single-purpose jurisdictions the theory and evidence seem to suggest that fragmenting them into
more units tends to either have no impact or a positive impact on their size [see Nelson (1987),
Boyne (1992), Eberts and Gronberg (1988), Baird and Landon (1972), Chicoine and Walzer
(1985), Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994), and Zax (1988)]. Once single-purpose districts are
thrown out of the analysis, Nelson (1987) and others show that more decentralization clearly
leads to more competitive, and smaller, governments.
In this paper we contribute to this literature using panel data on property tax rates for
municipalities, counties, and school districts in Pennsylvania. By focusing on one state we are
able to avoid problems with differing state or national constitutional constraints (e.g., even local
property tax limit laws in the U.S. are generally imposed on a state-wide basis). While tax limits
are imposed on jurisdictions in Pennsylvania, they are typically not strictly binding.7 In addition,
by narrowing our focus we are able to specifically examine tax rates rather than more vague
measures of overall government size, which can be misleading due to intergovernmental grants
or other factors [see Grossman (1989), Marlow (1988), and Shadbegian (1999) for an argument
7

For school districts, for example, additional levies above the limit are allowed to pay teachers, rent, and interest on
debt. These exceptions effectively eliminate (or at least significantly reduce) the „constitutional constraint‟ on
taxing power (Hartman and Nelson 2000).
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about intergovernmental grants and collusion among governments interfering with the previous
Leviathan tests]. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, we use two more recently introduced
measures of the competitiveness of governmental units that are becoming widely used, but are
not fully understood in terms of how they compare or what they exactly measure. In particular,
our measures are: (1) a Laffer-curve based estimate of the extent to which the current tax rate
compares to the rate that would maximize tax revenue, and (2) an estimate of spatial dependence
across jurisdictions (ρ) that measures the correlations across geographic space in the setting of
tax rates.
Our study differs from the previous federalism/Leviathan literature in that we model and
empirically test the mechanism through which federalism limits Leviathan. Likewise, we extend
the intergovernmental competition literature by providing empirical evidence on its implications
for the size of government. In sum, this paper combines the Leviathan, federalism, and
government competition literatures into one concise framework based on two models.
Using the Laffer-curve framework, we find that local Pennsylvania jurisdictions do
indeed set tax rates below the Leviathan revenue-maximizing levels, and that the more prevalent
(and thus more competitive) municipal governments operate further below their revenuemaximizing rates than do less prevalent (and thus less competitive) county governments. In
addition, using spatial econometric methods we find that the level of spatial dependence among
tax rates is higher (and thus more competitive) among municipal governments than among
county governments. Therefore, both measures point to the conclusion that more fiscal
decentralization, as measured by a larger number of governments in a given geographic area,
leads to a weakened ability for governments to achieve Leviathan outcomes.
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Our results for Pennsylvania school districts, which differ in that they are single-purpose
jurisdictions, are even more interesting. Our results confirm the idea from the previous literature
that single-purpose governments differ. We find that school districts, which are more prevalent
than county governments, but less prevalent than municipal governments, do not fall in the
middle in our measures of Leviathan tax rate setting and spatial dependence as expected.
Instead, school districts seem to be the closest to achieving Leviathan, revenue-maximizing, tax
rates (suggesting they are the least competitive) while they have the highest degree of spatial
dependence among their tax rates (suggesting, oppositely, that they are the most competitive).
This result highlights the fact that the more modern measure of spatial dependence as an estimate
of intergovernmental competition that is becoming widely used in the literature may fail to truly
measure the level of intergovernmental competitiveness. In fact, a high level of spatial
dependence in tax rates could be either a sign of competition or its opposite, collusion, as
collusive behavior also results in high interdependence in the setting of tax rates. We further
delve into this result for school districts by attempting to uncover whether it is their singlepurpose nature that causes this odd result, along the lines of Nelson (1987) and Eberts and
Gronberg (1988), or instead whether this result is due to collusive behavior among school
districts similar to that described by Grossman (1989), Marlow (1988), and Shadbegian (1999).
Based on these findings, we propose a new taxonomy that classifies governmental behavior in
one of four possible types, and shows the necessity of relying on more than the single measure of
spatial dependence to determine the competitiveness of governments.
Taken together, our results provide compelling evidence that fiscal decentralization does
constrain Leviathan behavior, and that measures of spatial dependence in tax rates are likely
imperfect measures of intergovernmental competition in the face of collusive behavior and/or
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single-purpose jurisdictions, relative to measures based on Laffer-curve estimates of how close
governments are to achieving revenue maximization.

3.2 Data
We use a panel of annual data on property tax rates and tax revenue for all levels of local
governments in Pennsylvania from 1995 through 2005 to empirically estimate our models. Our
unique data set includes three distinct levels of government: municipalities, school districts, and
counties. In total there are 2,522 municipalities, 501 school districts, and 66 counties in our
sample. Based on the fiscal decentralization literature one would expect that municipalities
would be the most competitive (as they are the most numerous), while counties would be the
least (as they are the least numerous), with school districts somewhere in the middle.8
While we are able to use the full sample for our Laffer-curve type estimates of how close
each government‟s tax rate is to the revenue-maximizing level, our spatial dependence measures
require the estimation of a balanced panel. Our balanced panel consists of 1,730 municipalities,
58 counties, and 500 school districts for the ten-year period 1995-2004. To ensure that the
differences in the estimates from the two different approaches were not driven by the different
samples, we estimate our Laffer-curve type model on both the balanced and unbalanced panels.
Descriptive statistics for all variables used in our paper are found in Appendix 3.1.
For county and municipal governments we obtain property tax rates from the
Pennsylvania Department of Community and Economic Development‟s Municipal Statistics
data. The tax rates used in this study are millage rates, expressed as taxes paid on each $1,000 of
assessed value. The rate at which property is assessed relative to its market value varies by
8

While this is the view taken in the majority of the literature, Epple and Zelenitz (1981) present a theoretical model
which shows that increasing the number of jurisdictions does not necessarily completely eliminate governmental
inefficiency.
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county and year. We use the „common-level ratio‟ (CLR) computed by the Pennsylvania State
Tax Equalization Board to adjust for this. Our definition of the effective tax rate is thus the
product of the statutory tax rate and its corresponding CLR (the rate at which property is
assessed relative to its market value). Per-capita property tax revenue is also obtained from the
Municipal Statistics data and we adjust it for inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI).
School district property tax rates and revenues are from the Pennsylvania Department of
Education. Differences in assessment rates are again corrected for using data from the State Tax
Equalization Board. The computation of annual revenue on a per capita basis for school
districts, however, is not possible because unlike municipal and county populations, which are
available annually, school district population is only available once per decade in census data.
We therefore employ two measures. First, the number of students in each school district is
available annually, so we can compute property tax revenue per student. Second, as a check for
robustness, we also estimate annual school district population to compute property tax revenue
per capita (rather than per student) by assuming the ratio of school district-to-county population
remains unchanged and then using annual county level population changes to extrapolate annual
changes in population within school districts starting from the true 2000 census school district
population.

3.3 Laffer Curves and Leviathan: Theoretical Model
The Laffer curve shows the inverted U-shaped relationship that exists for a government between
the tax rate it sets and the tax revenue it receives [see, for example, Laffer (2004)]. Tax revenues
are the smallest at either very low or very high tax rates, and are at their maximum somewhere in
between. This tax rate that maximizes tax revenue is the rate a Leviathan government would set
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in the absence of constitutional constraints or intergovernmental competition. Mathematical
models of this relationship, used by Brennan and Buchanan (1980), Garrett (2001), Sobel (1999),
and others, allow the empirical estimation of the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue for a
government. This revenue-maximizing rate can then be compared to the actual tax rates to
derive a measure of the extent to which a government is able to achieve its Leviathan goals. The
further the current tax rate is below the revenue-maximizing tax rate, the more the government is
being constrained by either formal constitutional constraints or by intergovernmental
competition.
This methodology has been used extensively in the literature, and we specifically follow
Garrett (2001) and Sobel (1999) in developing a Leviathan model that can be subsequently
estimated on our data. For government i at time t, total tax revenue, Rit is given by the product of
the tax rate (τit) and the level of the tax base, Bit. The tax base is a function of the tax rate in that
higher rates lower the quantity of the tax base, thus necessitating a functional form of Bit(τit) for
the tax base to show that it is a function of the tax rate.9

Rit   it Bit ( it )

(3.1)

A first-order linear approximation of the impact of the tax rate on the tax base can be given by:

Bit     it

(3.2)

where α > 0 and β < 0. Substituting (2) into (1) yields:

Rit   it   it2

(3.3)

The Leviathan revenue-maximizing tax rate is then found by differentiating (3) with
respect to τit and solving the first-order condition:

9

Consistent with other models of taxation in a federal system, see for example Sobel (1997), we model each level of
government as setting tax rates holding constant the rates of the other levels of government.
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Rit  it    2 it  0

(3.4)

which results in a solution for the tax rate that maximizes tax revenue,  itrevm ax:

 itrevm ax  


2

(3.5)

An unconstrained Leviathan government seeking to maximize revenue will set its tax rate equal
to the one shown in Equation (3.5).10 Thus, an approximation for the degree to which a
government is able to achieve this Leviathan outcome can be measured as the ratio of their
current tax rate, τit, to the revenue-maximizing rate,  itrevm ax. This relationship, which we dub the
„Leviathan ratio,‟ is thus given by:

LeviathanRatio 





it
revm ax
it

(3.6)

In theory this Leviathan ratio should take on values between zero and one with higher
values indicating less competitive behavior.11 The Leviathan ratio will take the value of one if
the government is currently achieving revenue maximization, while it will be less than one (but
greater than zero) if it is not. The lower is this ratio, the more the government is being
constrained from reaching its Leviathan goals.
Empirically, this revenue-maximizing tax rate to which the actual tax rate is to be
compared can be found by first estimating the revenue equation given in (3.3) to obtain the
values of α and β necessary to compute the revenue-maximizing rate using Equation (3.5).
Including cross-section (Zi) and time-period (Yt) fixed effects as well as an error term yields the
equation to be estimated:
10

Our empirical model focuses only on property tax rates and revenue and does not consider other types of optional
taxes or usage fees.
11

A value greater than one is mathematically possible, but would suggest the government is setting a rate above the
revenue-maximizing rate, in the „prohibitive range‟ of the Laffer curve.
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Rit   it   it2  1Zi  2Yt   it

(3.7)

where Rit is empirically measured as real per capita tax revenue to adjust for inflation and
jurisdiction size.

3.4 Laffer Curve Results
We estimate Laffer-curve models for each level of local government independently. Our Laffercurve estimates are summarized in Table 3.1. The coefficients for both effective tax rate and
effective tax rate squared are statistically significant in all three specifications and have signs
consistent with our model, with α > 0 and β < 0.
Table 3.1: Laffer Curve Models

Years

Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Property Tax Revenue
Municipality
County
1995-2005
1995-2004

Effective Property Tax Rate ()
Effective Property Tax Rate Squared (β)

6.576***
(6.723)
-0.094***
(-4.794)

32.293***
(6.138)
-1.280**
(-2.094)

276.143***
(28.515)
-3.458***
(-17.417)

35.12

12.62

39.93

26391 (2522, 11)
0.90

649 (66, 10)
0.92

5511 (501, 11)
0.98

Calculated Revenue-Maximizing Rate (β)
Number of Observations (N,T)
R-squared

School District
1995-2005

Note: All models include cross-section and time period fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses: * indicates
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.

The third row of Table 3.1 includes the estimated revenue-maximizing rate, calculated in
accordance with Equation (3.5). The estimated revenue-maximizing effective property tax rate is
35.12 mills for municipalities, 12.62 mills for counties, and 39.93 mills for school districts.
As detailed in Sobel (1999) and Garrett (2001), these point estimates of the revenuemaximizing rates found by taking the ratio of the two coefficient estimates are not actually the
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true „best‟ estimates as they ignore the covariance between the estimates of α and β. That is, the
expected value of the ratio of two coefficients is not identical to the ratio of the expected values
of each individual coefficient. To account for this, we follow the procedure used in Sobel (1999)
and originally described by Jeong and Maddala (1993) of using Monte Carlo simulations based
on the point estimates and covariance matrices of each jurisdiction to compute empirical
distributions of the estimated revenue-maximizing tax rates. The means of these distributions,
along with the associated 90% and 95% confidence intervals are summarized in Table 3.2.
These rates provide a more accurate approximation of the revenue-maximizing rates for each
jurisdiction. The municipality and school district simulation estimates are nearly identical to the
original regression estimate, while the county rate taken from the empirical distribution is higher.
To analyze how close jurisdictions are coming to behaving like revenue-maximizing
Leviathans, we compare actual tax rates to our simulation estimates by computing the Leviathan
ratio given in Equation (3.6). Simply comparing these estimated revenue-maximizing rates with
the average rates set by each level of government suggests that, on average, all levels set tax
rates well below revenue-maximization. The average municipality in our sample has an effective
tax rate set at only 5% of the revenue-maximizing rate. Similarly, the average county sets a rate
equal to 24% of revenue maximization. Interestingly, school districts set rates nearest to
revenue-maximization, with the average district tax rate 53% of the Leviathan rate. Thus, using
these ratios to infer about the relative Leviathan abilities of the different levels of government
would imply that municipalities are the most competitive and least able to achieve Leviathan
goals, followed by counties, with school districts as the least competitive and closest to achieving
the Leviathan outcome of unconstrained revenue maximization.
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Table 3.2: Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rates
Municipality County School District
Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate: Regression
Point Estimate (α/-2β)

35.12

12.62

39.93

Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate: Monte Carlo
Simulation Estimate of Mean of the Empirical
Distribution

35.71

14.41

39.99

Lower 90% Confidence Interval
Upper 90% Confidence Interval

29.95
43.75

8.61
34.52

38.43
41.72

Lower 95% Confidence Interval
29.03
Upper 95% Confidence Interval
46.18
Number of Observations
Number < 90% CI
26388
Number within 90% CI
4
Number > 90% CI
3

8.04
51.74

38.19
42.11

649
0
0

5486
20
5

26388
649
4
0
3
0
Percentage of Observations
99.97% 100.00%
0.02%
0.00%
0.01%
0.00%

5482
24
5

Number < 95% CI
Number within 95% CI
Number > 95% CI
% < 90% CI
% within 90% CI
% > 90% CI

99.55%
0.36%
0.09%

% < 95% CI
99.97% 100.00%
99.47%
% within 95% CI
0.02%
0.00%
0.44%
% > 95% CI
0.01%
0.00%
0.09%
Leviathan Ratio: Ratio of Actual to Revenue-Maximizing Tax Rate
Mean Actual Tax Rate
0.05443 0.24152
0.53291
Mode Actual Tax Rate
0.03193 0.21867
0.47263
Note: The regression point estimate is based on a calculation using the coefficient estimates from the model, a
nonlinear combination of expected values; the mean of the empirical distribution is the expected value of the
nonlinear combination, which differs because of the covariance between the coefficient estimates. Estimates are
derived from 3,000 Monte Carlo simulations. Because of the skewness of the distributions, the upper and lower
confidence ranges were switched appropriately (see Hall (1992); Jeong and Maddala (1993)).

These averages, however, can mask differences across jurisdictions. Thus, it is necessary
to compare each jurisdiction‟s tax rate individually against the estimated revenue-maximizing
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rate. In addition, with our estimated Monte Carlo distributions we can ask whether the rates set
by any given jurisdiction are significantly below the revenue-maximizing rate. All 649 county
observations lie below the revenue-maximizing rate, and outside of the associated confidence
interval. Overall, 99.97% of municipalities have tax rates below those that would maximize
revenue with only 7 of the 26,388 observations lying either within or above the confidence
interval. School districts have the highest percentage of jurisdictions within or above the
confidence interval of revenue maximization, but still have 99.55% of observations falling below
the Leviathan rate.

Percentage of Jurisdictions

Figure 3.1: Relative Frequency Distribution: Leviathan Ratio
18.0%
16.0%
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Figure 3.1 shows the relative frequency distribution of the Leviathan ratio for each
individual local government for all three levels of government. The distribution for
municipalities shows that they are clearly the furthest from achieving revenue maximization,
followed by counties, with school districts being the closest to maximizing revenues. As is
visible in Figure 3.1, some school districts actually approach a Leviathan ratio of 1, implying that
they are coming close to true Leviathan revenue maximization.
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The results from this Laffer-curve based estimation suggest that municipalities are indeed
more competitive than counties, or alternatively, that counties are closer to achieving Leviathan
outcomes than municipalities. With municipalities numbering much greater than counties, this is
consistent with the idea that greater decentralization, measured by a greater number of local
governments, leads to more intergovernmental competition, and a lessened ability of
governments to achieve Leviathan goals. School districts, on the other hand, do not fit this
model, as they seem to be more able to achieve Leviathan goals than counties even though they
are more numerous. Simply based on the number of governments, one would have expected the
Leviathan ratios for school districts to fall somewhere between those for municipalities and
counties. We revisit this issue after presenting our results of competitiveness based on spatial
dependence in tax rates.

3.5 Spatial Competition and Interdependence: Theory
Following the tradition of Tiebout (1956), a number of studies have attempted to model and
empirically test strategic interaction across competing jurisdictions. Inter-jurisdictional tax
competition has theoretical foundations in Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Oates and Schwab (1988),
Kanbur and Keen (1993), and Brueckner (2000). Brueckner (2003) provides a survey of the
empirical methodologies employed in these types of studies. Typically, the empirical
specifications are based on policy best response functions derived from models assuming a
mobile factor. One such paper by Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) finds evidence of strategic
property-tax competition in a sample of Boston metropolitan jurisdictions. Other tax
competition studies based on this reaction function approach include Hayashi and Boadway
(2001), Buettner (2001), and Brett and Pinkse (2000).
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These models generally assume a mobile factor for which governments compete through
setting of tax or expenditure policy.12 Since the factor‟s choice of location depends both on the
policy of a given jurisdiction as well as the policy in competing jurisdictions, each government‟s
policy is a function of its neighbors‟ policies. Note that this intergovernmental competition for
the factor provides a theoretical explanation for the inverse relationship between tax base and
rate shown in Equation (3.2). Once the optimal policy as a function of exogenous variables is
derived for a given jurisdiction‟s neighbors, its best-response function may be obtained.
We follow Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) who derive an empirical version of
jurisdictions‟ reaction functions for property taxation:

 i   ij j  X i    i

(3.8)

j i

where τi is the effective property tax rate in jurisdiction i, εi is a vector of error terms,
and  ij is a weighting scheme that determines how neighboring jurisdictions‟ tax rates
j i

influence jurisdiction i's policy. The vector Xi is made up of demographic and policy variables
for jurisdiction i which also affect the effective tax rate. The policy variables account for factors
which directly impact the choice of τi while the demographic characteristics proxy for the
preferences of consumer-voters. The weighting parameters ωij are chosen arbitrarily to quantify
„neighboring‟ jurisdictions. Traditionally, weight matrices have been based on contiguity or
some function of distance [see LeSage and Pace (2009)]. Our initial analysis uses a contiguity

12

Papke (1991) presents empirical evidence in support of this assumption by showing that new firm births in a given
state are negatively related to effective business tax rates.
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weight matrix while additional specifications are explored as a test for robustness in a subsequent
section of the paper. 13
When Equation (3.8) is extended to account for multiple time periods, it can be expressed
as the panel model:

 it   ij jt  X it   Z i  Yt   it

(3.9)

j i

with Zi and Yt again representing cross-section and time-period fixed effects. Once all
jurisdictions are considered, and represented as vectors, Equation (3.9) can be represented as

 t  W t  X t      t

(3.10)

where τt is the vector of effective property tax rates such that  t   1t ,..., Nt  , X t   X 1t ,...,X Nt  ,

 t  1t ,..., Nt  , W the spatial weight matrix, and μ a matrix of time and cross-section fixed
effects. The weight matrix is made up of elements ωij from Equation (3.7) and zeroes on the
main diagonal. Since the geographic arrangement of jurisdictions does not change, the elements
of W are time invariant. As before, the inclusion of fixed effects accounts for omitted variables
which are invariant either through time or across space. Further, as noted by Elhorst and Fréret
(forthcoming) time-period fixed effects help correct for spatial interaction in the error term.
Equation (3.10) is the spatial autoregressive (SAR) model to be estimated using
maximum likelihood techniques.14 The parameter of interest is ρ which measures the degree of
spatial dependence. If governments are in competition with one another, one would anticipate a
positive dependence among their tax rates. When one jurisdiction lowers its rates, nearby
13

Contiguity at the county level is first-order queen. School district and municipality contiguity is based on
Delaunay triangles using latitude/longitude coordinates. Specifically, we use the „xy2cont‟ function for MatLab
from James P. LeSage‟s spatial econometrics toolbox.
14

Specifically, we use the “sar_panel_FE” function for MatLab written by J. Paul Elhorst. A full treatment of the
estimation technique can be found in Elhorst (2009). To calculate the total effect estimates (LeSage and Pace 2009)
we use an updated version of the routine written by Donald Lacombe and available at
http://www.rri.wvu.edu/lacombe/~lacombe.htm.
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governments must lower tax rates as well to remain competitive. The larger is the degree of
spatial dependence (ρ) the greater is the degree of competition. A value of zero would imply that
governments act independently, either due to an absence of true competition or the presence of
strict constitutional constraints that, for example, set tax rates at fixed levels.
In the estimation of Equation (3.10), we include additional socio-economic variables
similar to Brueckner and Saavedra (2001), with some variation due to data availability. These
extra control variables are real per-capita expenditure, real median household income, the
proportion of the population that is African American, the student proportion of the population,
real per-capita state and federal grants, population, and population density. Per-capita
expenditure is collected from the Municipal Statistics data for counties and municipalities and
the National Center for Education Statistics (NCES) for school districts. One problem with
including expenditures as an independent variable in determining tax rates is the possibility that
they are endogenous in that tax rates actually determine expenditures. To keep with the existing
literature we include expenditures with a lag. However, in our robustness tests (detailed in
Section 7), we estimate the model omitting this variable and find similar results. The expected
sign for expenditure is positive as jurisdictions will set higher rates, ceteris paribus, as their
expenditure needs grow. Data for state and federal grants is also obtained from Municipal
Statistics for counties and municipalities, and from NCES for school districts. As grants increase
we would expect to see a fall in effective tax rates. As before, these variables are adjusted for
inflation using the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Finally, population data comes from the
Municipal statistics for counties and municipalities and the NCES for school districts.
Data for median household income, the proportion African American, the proportion
student-aged among the population, and population density are all obtained from Census
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estimates at the county level. For the municipality and school district models these county
variables are considered reasonable proxies for jurisdictional characteristics. The expected sign
for income is negative since higher incomes likely translate into higher property values which
means the same level of public goods can be provided by the jurisdiction at lower rates, ceteris
paribus. The proportion of the population that is African American captures any differences in
demand for policy that results from larger minority populations. Similarly, population density
captures differences in tax policy resulting from the urban/rural characteristics of the jurisdiction.
Finally, as the student percentage of the population increases we would expect to see higher tax
rates as the demand for services increases.

3.6 Spatial Dependence Results
Our spatial autoregressive (SAR) model estimates are summarized in the first three columns of
Table 3.3 (the final column is a robustness check to be discussed in the next section). The
models fit well, with R-squared measures of 0.71, 0.89, and 0.92. We find positive, statistically
significant spatial dependence at all three levels of local government. This indicates jurisdictions
of all types base a portion of their tax policy on the policy of their neighbors—that is, there is
spatial competition between jurisdictions, the extent of which differs across government levels.
The estimates shown for the explanatory variables are the total effect estimates (which include
direct and indirect effects), following LeSage and Pace (2009).
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Table 3.3: Spatial Autoregressive Models
Dependent Variable: Effective Property Tax Rate, 1995-2004
Municipality
County
School District School District (Alternate)
Rho (Spatial Dependence)
Real Per Capita Expenditure (Lagged)
Real Median Household Income
Proportion African American
Proportion Student
Real Per Capita State & Federal Grants
Population
Population Density
Number of Observations (N,T)
R-squared

0.201***
(77.162)
-0.002
(-0.783)
-0.006**
(-2.084)
-0.440
(-0.180)
0.280
(0.170)
0.053
(0.500)
-0.014
(-0.680)
0.001
(1.400)

0.155***
(2.804)
0.685**
(2.546)
-0.011**
(-2.309)
-3.656
(-0.958)
2.422
(0.729)
-1.279***
(-3.067)
0.036***
(3.373)
-0.022
(-3.484)

0.544***
(33.461)
0.228***
(7.481)
-0.021**
(-2.327)
18.141***
(4.584)
12.539**
(2.190)
-0.313*
(-1.838)
1.802***
(8.259)
0.009***
(3.440)

0.528***
(31.804)
1.297***
(7.082)
-0.021**
(-2.414)
20.871***
(5.542)
13.170**
(2.423)
-5.632***
(-5.373)
0.287***
(5.526)
0.010***
(4.059)

17300 (1730,10)
0.71

580 (58,10)
0.89

5000 (500,10)
0.92

5000 (500,10)
0.92

Note: All models include cross-section and time period fixed effects; estimates for constant and fixed effect
coefficients not shown. t-statistics in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, ***
at 1%. Total effect estimates [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and Pace (2009)] shown for explanatory
variables.

Our point estimates indicate that counties in our sample exhibit less spatial dependence
(0.155) than do municipalities (0.201), implying they are facing weaker competitive forces.
Alternatively stated, municipalities appear less able to achieve Leviathan goals than counties.
This is the same result found using the Leviathan ratio estimates in the previous section. Thus,
both estimation methods appear to indicate that with a much larger number of competing
governments within the given geographic area, municipalities are less able to be Leviathans than
are counties. However, it is worth noting that while the point estimate of spatial dependence for
municipalities is higher, it is not significantly different from the value for counties using a t-test.
The estimate of ρ for school districts (0.544) is statistically much higher than the values
for either municipalities or counties, implying school districts exhibit the highest degree of
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spatial interaction. If the degree of spatial dependence measures competitiveness, then this result
would seem to suggest that school districts are the most competitive, and least able to achieve
Leviathan goals. Not only is this inconsistent with the ordering predicted based on the number
of governments (as school districts should have fallen in between municipalities and counties),
but it is the exact opposite result obtained from the Leviathan ratio estimates. Our Leviathan tax
rate estimates suggested that school districts were the least competitive, and most able to achieve
Leviathan goals, with their tax rates being the closest of all levels to revenue-maximization. The
spatial results, however, would imply exactly the opposite. This high degree of spatial
dependence, coupled with more Leviathan-like tax rates appears to be a contradiction. Whether
this is due to school districts being single-purpose and thus fundamentally different, as was
found in previous Leviathan literature, or whether it is a sign of collusion (which would also
result in a high degree of spatial dependence, but not be reflective of competition) is something
we will return to after presenting our robustness checks.
Turning to our control variables and their performance, only income is statistically
significant in the municipality specification, which may indicate tax policy is set mostly as a
function of neighboring policy. This is consistent with a high level of competition at the
municipality level. Lagged per capita expenditure is positive and statistically significant in the
county and school district models, though the coefficient is economically small. Similarly,
income is negative and statistically significant in the county and school district models, with a
trivially small coefficient estimate. The proportion of the population that is African American is
positive and significant in the school district specification. Unsurprisingly, the proportion
student variable is positive and significant in the school district model. Per capita grants are
negatively related to tax rates, also as predicted. For both the county and school district
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specifications, population is positive and significant, while density is negative in the county
specification and positive in the school district model.

3.7 Robustness Checks
To estimate the revenue-maximizing property tax rates we used unbalanced panels for each level.
However, our spatial autoregressive models required balanced panels of data due to the time
invariant nature of the weight matrix. As such, in order to estimate the spatial models we were
forced to drop a year of data for the municipality and school district models and a number of
cross-section observations at each level. To ensure that the difference between our Leviathan
revenue-maximizing rate results and the spatial dependence results is not caused by the slightly
different samples used in the estimations, we re-estimate our Laffer curve models using the same
sample used in our spatial model. The results are presented in the first three columns of Table
3.4. Despite losing observations, the point estimates for each revenue-maximizing tax rate
remain largely unchanged. Moreover, the new estimates are within the computed confidence
intervals presented earlier. We also recalculate the Leviathan ratio at each level using the new
point estimates. Again, the results (also shown in Table 3.4) are largely unchanged, with only
the county Leviathan ratio increasing slightly but remaining well below the school district ratio.
Thus, the difference in the samples is not responsible for the different results, particularly for
school districts, found in our earlier specification.
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Table 3.4: Laffer Curve Models: Balanced Panel Estimates
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Property Tax Revenue
Municipality
County
School District
1995-2004
1995-2004
1995-2004

Years
Effective Property Tax Rate ()

Effective Property Tax Rate Squared (β)

Calculated Revenue-Maximizing Rate (β)
Number of Observations (N,T)
R-squared

School District (Alternate)
1995-2004

4.828***
(6.475)
-0.073***
(-5.383)

31.953***
(5.718)
-1.304**
(-1.990)

259.580***
(28.433)
-3.148***
(-16.713)

37.291***
(20.484)
-0.345***
(-9.175)

33.40

12.25

41.23

54.11

17300 (1730, 10)
0.83

580 (58, 10)
0.91

5000 (500, 10)
0.99

5000 (500, 10)
0.97

Note: All models include cross-section and time period fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses: * indicates
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.

Our second robustness check involves our inability to get annual data on school district
population to use in the computation of per capita measures (population at the school district
level is only available in the once-per decade census numbers). In our results presented earlier
we use the number of students in the school district (which is available annually) in the
computation of the per capita values for school districts. Here, as a check for robustness, we
estimate annual school district population to compute property tax revenue per capita (rather than
per student). By assuming the ratio of school district-to-county population remains unchanged, it
becomes possible to use annual county level population changes to extrapolate annual changes in
population within school districts starting from the true 2000 census school district population.
The fourth column of Table 3.4 includes a Laffer curve model using the alternative
measure of population for school districts discussed above. The point estimate of the revenuemaximizing tax rate using this alternative measure is much higher than that we found earlier
using per-student data. The estimate of 54.11 is also high enough to lie outside of our simulated
confidence intervals. Since school districts were already setting tax rates much lower than our
previous estimate of revenue-maximization, this result shows school districts are even further
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below their revenue-maximizing rates than we found previously. Using this new point estimate,
the average school district is setting a tax rate of only 39.38% that which would maximize
estimated per-capita revenue. Though this Leviathan ratio is much lower than the previously
estimated ratio of 53.29%, it still remains higher than either counties or municipalities. Thus,
even with this alternative measure, school districts are setting tax rates nearer to revenue
maximization than either counties or municipalities.
For completeness, we also estimate our spatial autoregressive model using the alternative
school district population measure. These results are shown in the last column of Table 3.3. The
measure of spatial dependence remained highly statistically significant and positive with a
similar magnitude. The new value of ρ, 0.528, remains higher and statistically different from the
county or municipality estimates. The sign and significance of the independent variables does
not vary between the two specifications, and all total effects are of similar magnitude.
The tax competition literature, which motivates our SAR model, is based on the
assumption that some mobile factor (labor, capital, etc.) considers all neighboring tax rates when
making its location choice. While this clearly implies spatial dependence in tax-setting, it also
suggests the possibility that a jurisdiction‟s tax revenue is not only a function of its own tax rate,
but also a function of neighboring rates. Thus, as a check for robustness, we re-estimate our
Laffer curve models including the geographically-weighted average of neighboring property tax
rates as an additional explanatory variable. This variable is constructed using the effective
property tax rate multiplied by the contiguity weight matrix developed for our SAR models.
Including this measure of neighboring tax rates in equation (3.2) yields

Bit     it   itneighbor
while the equation to be estimated becomes

65

(3.11)

Rit   it   it2   ( it  itneighbor)  1Zi  2Yt   it .

(3.12)

Table 3.5: Laffer Curve Models: Alternative Specification

Years

Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita Property Tax Revenue
Municipality
County
1995-2004
1995-2004

Effective Property Tax Rate ()
Effective Property Tax Rate Squared (β)
Average Neighbor Effective Property Tax Rate

5.281***
(7.029)
-0.142***
(-7.105)
0.387***
(4.706)

35.387***
(5.863)
-1.225*
(-1.866)
-1.075
(-1.495)

271.994***
(27.033)
-3.090***
(-16.332)
-0.500***
(-2.924)

18.62

14.44

44.01

17300(1730, 10)
0.83

580 (58, 10)
0.91

5000 (500, 10)
0.99

Calculated Revenue-Maximizing Rate (β)
Number of Observations (N,T)
R-squared

School District
1995-2004

Note: All models include cross-section and time period fixed effects. t-statistics in parentheses: * indicates
statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%.

Table 3.5 presents the results of these specifications. The sign, significance, and
magnitude of the tax rate and tax rate squared variables remain largely unchanged from our
previous estimates. While the revenue-maximizing rate for municipalities is lower than in
previous specifications, it is still high enough such that the average municipality has a Leviathan
Ratio of only .10. Thus, municipalities remain the most heavily constrained. The statistical
significance and sign of the effect of the average neighboring tax rate variable varies across
jurisdiction type. At the municipality level, increases in neighboring tax rates lead to increases
in property tax revenue. This is consistent with our hypothesis of highly competitive municipal
governments: ceteris paribus, increases in competitor taxes likely lead to increases in the amount
of tax base choosing to locate in a given municipality. At the county level, an increase in
neighboring tax rates has no statistically significant effect on property tax revenue. This result
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lends credence to county governments being less competitive. Finally, school district property
tax revenues fall as neighboring school districts raise rates, ceteris paribus. This result is clearly
not consistent with a model of competitive jurisdictions, providing further evidence of
noncompetitive behavior at the school district level. In sum, while neighboring tax rates do seem
to be significant drivers of property tax revenue at the municipality and school district levels, the
Laffer curve relationship predicted by our original model is robust to the inclusion of this
variable.
As mentioned previously, the inclusion of lagged expenditures in our spatial
autoregressive models may introduce problems of simultaneity. Thus, we estimate these models
without the expenditure control as a check for robustness. These results are presented in Table
3.6. The results are nearly identical, both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance.
Most importantly, the estimated level of spatial dependence does not change significantly at any
level. These results provide evidence that the inclusion of expenditures in the previous
specification does not bias our results.
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Table 3.6: Spatial Autoregressive Models: Alternative Specification
Dependent Variable: Effective Property Tax Rate, 1995-2004
Municipality
County
School District School District (Alternate)
Rho (Spatial Dependence)
Real Median Household Income
Proportion African American
Proportion Student
Real Per Capita State & Federal Grants
Population
Population Density

0.199***
(17.220)
-0.006**
(-2.067)
-0.402
(-0.163)
0.262
(0.160)
0.046
(0.433)
-0.014
(-0.696)
0.001
(1.355)

0.149***
(2.681)
-0.011**
(-2.524)
-4.868
(-1.289)
3.700
(1.101)
-1.126***
(-2.775)
0.036***
(3.416)
-0.022***
(-3.499)

0.546***
(33.522)
-0.021**
(-2.359)
17.381***
(4.321)
11.632**
(2.082)
-0.148
(-0.877)
1.721***
(7.849)
0.010***
(3.671)

0.528***
(31.655)
-0.021***
(-2.451)
20.240***
(5.239)
13.996***
(2.566)
-4.720***
(-4.529)
0.286***
(5.573)
0.011***
(4.162)

Number of Observations (N,T)
17300 (1730,10) 580 (58,10) 5000 (500,10)
5000 (500,10)
R-squared
0.71
0.89
0.91
0.91
Note: All models include cross-section and time period fixed effects; estimates for constant and fixed effect
coefficients not shown. t-statistics in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, ***
at 1%. Total effect estimates [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and Pace (2009)] shown for explanatory
variables.

As a final check for robustness of our spatial autoregressive model, we explore the use of
different weight matrices. The weight matrix is chosen arbitrarily, so the use of alternative
weighting schemes ensures our previous findings are not an artifact of the definition of
„neighbor‟ imposed on the model. Our previous specification (shown in Table 3.3) employed the
most frequently used weight matrix, based on first-order contiguity. A popular alternative is the
use of distance-based „nearest neighbor‟ weight matrices. These matrices assign to each
jurisdiction a common number of neighbors (based on distance) regardless of whether the
jurisdictions actually share a common border, while contiguity matrices are not so constrained
and count any bordering jurisdiction as a neighbor.
Table 3.7 presents results from the estimation of our SAR model using two such weight
matrices. W5 denotes a specification using a weight matrix based on five nearest neighbors,

68

while W7 denotes a weight matrix based on seven nearest neighbors.15 Spatial dependence at
each level remains statistically significant and largely unchanged in terms of magnitude. The
county-level ρ estimate is slightly higher in the W5 specification (0.171) but still remains lower
than either the municipality or school district estimates. School district spatial dependence is
higher in the W7 specification. The parameter estimates for all control variables retain the same
sign and statistical significance from the previous specification.

15

The determination of nearest neighbors is based on distance calculated using latitude and longitude coordinates.
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17300 (1730,10) 17300 (1730,10)
0.71
0.71

580 (58,10)
0.89

580 (58,10)
0.89

School District (Alternate)
W5
W7
0.528***
0.582***
(35.226)
(36.773)
1.199***
1.335***
(6.580)
(6.386)
-0.021***
-0.021**
(-2.420)
(-2.129)
19.567***
21.423***
(5.221)
(4.972)
13.307**
11.792*
(2.482)
(1.936)
-5.208***
-5.177***
(-4.992)
(-4.487)
0.293***
0.306***
(5.769)
(5.273)
0.011***
0.011***
(4.256)
(4.081)

5000 (500,10) 5000 (500,10) 5000 (500,10) 5000 (500,10)
0.92
0.92
0.92
0.92

Dependent Variable: Effective Property Tax Rate, 1995-2004
Municipality
County
School District
W5
W7
W5
W7
W5
W7
0.235***
0.236***
0.172***
0.153**
0.528***
0.594***
(84.014)
(72.404)
(2.744)
(2.077)
(35.513)
(38.388)
-0.002
-0.002
0.709**
0.687**
0.207***
0.250***
(-0.797)
(-0.781)
(2.522)
(2.422)
(7.034)
(7.519)
-0.006**
-0.006**
-0.011**
-0.010**
-0.020**
-0.021**
(-2.084)
(-1.988)
(-2.292)
(-2.211)
(-2.394)
(-2.062)
0.062
-0.146
-3.996
-3.660
16.545***
18.479***
(0.024)
(-0.057)
(-1.042)
(-0.971)
(4.378)
(4.265)
0.114
-0.032
1.915
2.065
12.997**
11.284*
(0.065)
(-0.019)
(0.571)
(0.624)
(2.390)
(1.835)
0.043
0.046
-1.295***
-1.277***
-0.237
-0.160
(0.384)
(0.412)
(-3.058)
(-3.011)
(-1.461)
(-0.847)
-0.011
-0.013
0.036***
0.036***
1.845***
1.970***
(-0.540)
(-0.614)
(3.383)
(3.365)
(8.725)
(8.196)
0.001
0.001
-0.022***
-0.022***
0.009***
0.010***
(1.326)
(1.292)
(-3.448)
(-3.405)
(3.606)
(3.387)

Table 3.7: Spatial Autoregressive Models: Alternative Weight Matrices

Weight Matrix:
Rho (Spatial Dependence)
Real Per Capita Expenditure (Lagged)
Real Median Household Income
Proportion African American
Proportion Student
Real Per Capita State & Federal Grants
Population
Population Density
Number of Observations (N,T)
R-squared

Note: All models include cross-section and time period fixed effects; estimates for constant and fixed effect coefficients not shown. t-statistics in
parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Total effect estimates [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and
Pace (2009)] shown for explanatory variables.
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17300 (1730,10) 17300 (1730,10)
0.71
0.71

580 (58,10)
0.89

580 (58,10)
0.89

School District (Alternate)
Wd
Wp
0.668***
0.528***
(34.146)
(31.804)
1.820***
1.297***
(6.465)
(7.027)
-0.029**
-0.021***
(-2.279)
(-2.403)
34.457***
20.897***
(6.034)
(5.503)
8.299
13.121***
(1.051)
(2.356)
-6.511***
-5.624***
(-4.292)
(-5.434)
0.333***
0.286***
(4.392)
(5.445)
0.007*
0.010***
(1.796)
(4.127)

5000 (500,10) 5000 (500,10) 5000 (500,10) 5000 (500,10)
0.91
0.92
0.91
0.92

Dependent Variable: Effective Property Tax Rate, 1995-2004
Municipality
County
School District
Wd
Wp
Wd
Wp
Wd
Wp
0.256***
0.201***
0.209***
0.155***
0.683***
0.544***
(13.610)
(77.162)
(4.222)
(2.804)
(35.880)
(33.461)
-0.002
-0.003
0.783***
0.684***
0.343***
0.229***
(-0.792)
(-0.783)
(2.674)
(2.462)
(7.228)
(7.496)
-0.005*
-0.006**
-0.011**
-0.011**
-0.030**
-0.021**
(-1.923)
(-2.086)
(-2.267)
(-2.347)
(2.254)
(-2.269)
0.037
-0.465
-4.101
-3.665
31.906***
18.127***
(0.014)
(-0.191)
(-1.007)
(-0.970)
(5.342)
(4.606)
-0.035
0.307
3.283
2.452
8.379
12.434**
(-0.019)
(0.185)
(0.936)
(0.747)
(1.013)
(2.209)
0.048
0.049
-1.367***
-1.272***
-0.122
-0.312*
(0.421)
(0.464)
(-3.180)
(-3.050)
(-0.499)
(-1.863)
-0.018
-0.014
0.036***
0.036***
2.199***
1.804***
(-0.803)
(-0.014)
(3.257)
(3.469)
(6.701)
(8.134)
0.001
0.001
-0.023***
-0.022***
0.005
0.009***
(1.283)
(1.394)
(-3.342)
(-3.572)
(1.275)
(3.495)

Table 3.8: Spatial Autoregressive Models: Alternative Weight Matrices

Weight Matrix:
Rho (Spatial Dependence)
Real Per Capita Expenditure (Lagged)
Real Median Household Income
Proportion African American
Proportion Student
Real Per Capita State & Federal Grants
Population
Population Density
Number of Observations (N,T)
R-squared

Note: All models include cross-section and time period fixed effects; estimates for constant and fixed effect coefficients not shown. t-statistics in
parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at 5%, *** at 1%. Total effect estimates [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and
Pace (2009)] shown for explanatory variables.
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Table 3.8 presents SAR results using two more weight matrices. The Wd specification
employs a weight matrix based on distance (the nearer a jurisdiction is, the more heavily it is
weighted) and allows for the possibility of jurisdictions to respond to all other jurisdictions of the
same level. The Wp weight matrix is the contiguity weight matrix used in our original
specification, scaled by population. This technique, discussed in Baicker (2005), attributes more
„weight‟ to larger neighboring jurisdictions and is motivated by the traditional gravity model. As
before, we observe few changes in our estimates of spatial dependence despite the use of these
alternative weighting schemes. While the Wd specification predicts higher dependence at the
county level (0.209), it also predicts higher dependence at the municipality (0.256) and school
district (0.683) levels, preserving the ordering found in our previous specifications. The
population-scaled weight matrix results are largely identical to previous specifications as well.
In sum, our spatial dependence results are robust to a variety of weighting specifications.

3.8 Revisiting School Districts: Collusion vs. Single-purpose Jurisdictions
Our results for counties and municipalities correspond to what one might have expected. There
are a much larger number of municipalities (2,522) than counties (66) in our data set for
Pennsylvania, and based on the fiscal decentralization hypothesis, we should expect
municipalities to be more competitive and thus less able to pursue Leviathan revenuemaximization goals. Our results from both our Laffer-curve, Leviathan models and the spatial
dependence models showed the expected result: counties set tax rates closer to revenuemaximizing levels than do municipalities, and municipalities exhibit a higher degree of spatial
dependence across jurisdictions.
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The results for school districts, however, did not fit this mold. While school districts
number somewhere between the other two (501), they showed tax rates the closest to revenuemaximization (suggesting the least competitive or most Leviathan-like), but ironically they also
exhibit the highest degree of spatial dependence (suggesting alternatively that they are the most
competitive or least Leviathan-like). If these two measures of governmental competitiveness
were measuring the same thing, one would have not expected school districts to have,
simultaneously, the highest degree of spatial dependence and also tax rates closer to Leviathan
levels than the other two levels of government. This leads us to one of two possible explanations
for this seemingly odd result.
First, it is possible that the single-purpose nature of school districts simply causes them to
be different. School districts provide a single good, while municipal and county governments
provide a bundle of services. Recall that previous Leviathan literature finds that single-purpose
governmental units (like school districts or special governmental units offering only fire or water
service) seem to be fundamentally different than traditional (multi-purpose) jurisdictions such as
city, county, or national governments. The previous literature argues that for single-purpose
jurisdictions, fragmenting them into more units tends to have either no impact or a positive
impact on size [see Nelson (1987), Boyne (1992), Eberts and Gronberg (1988), Baird and
Landon (1972), Chicoine and Walzer (1985), Dowding, John, and Biggs (1994), and Zax
(1988)].
The nature of the provision of education may have unique characteristics making school
districts fundamentally different from other levels of government. While many of the services
provided by municipal governments exhibit some public good characteristics, a number of these
services are contracted to private providers (e.g. trash collection). This may indicate municipal
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governments are more inclined to act competitively. However, the sheer number of private
schools suggests at least some quantity of education (the good provided by school districts) can
be provided privately. Thus, this mix of private and public characteristics seems to exist at all
levels of local government, and is not unique to school districts.
Further, even if the single-purpose jurisdiction argument were true, one would still expect
our two measures to both show either high (or low) degrees of competition (which they did not),
but with school districts simply not falling in between the results for counties and municipalities
as predicted purely by the number of jurisdictions ordering. Thus, given school districts‟
divergent results on the two measures, the single-purpose jurisdiction argument can not explain
our findings.
The second explanation is that the Leviathan ratio measures and the measures of spatial
dependence simply do not both measure the degree of intergovernmental competition. Recall
that other papers in this literature suggest that collusive behavior among governments,
particularly through the use of intergovernmental grants, is important in explaining why some
studies have found different results than others [see Grossman (1989), Marlow (1988), and
Shadbegian (1999)]. In essence, one way governments can escape competitive pressures on tax
levels is to get a higher level government to levy the taxes for them and redistribute the revenue
back to the lower (colluding) level of government. This explanation is at least partially born out
by the data in that state and federal grants as a share of revenue are 21% for municipalities, 30%
for counties, and 45% for school districts in our sample, suggesting the highest degree of
collusion among school districts.
There are several additional reasons to suspect school districts are uniquely able to
engage in cooperation or collusion. First, school districts in Pennsylvania are organized under a
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single Department of Education. Further, school districts must negotiate with a single large
teachers‟ union which has the ability to bargain for all teachers at the state level. In other words,
by definition a number of costs (such as teacher salaries) are set collectively. Additionally,
school districts tend to rely on the property tax as a primary source of revenue whereas other
local governments have additional revenue sources available. As such, competition on property
tax rates between school districts leading to a „race to the bottom‟ would likely lead to serious
revenue consequences as the districts do not have a ready substitute source of revenue. Finally,
the state‟s Department of Education manages a subsidy program for “Basic Education Funding”
which distributes funds to school districts based on the districts‟ spending relative to an
„adequacy target,‟ further collectivizing the fiscal decision-making of school districts
(Pennsylvania Department of Education).
The problem collusion creates for the spatial dependence measure is that the
intergovernmental correlations in tax rates are high not only when governments compete, but
also when they collude. This fundamentally calls into question the current literature‟s blind use
of the spatial dependence estimate as a measure of tax competition. Interestingly, while the
spatial dependence measure is affected by collusion, the Leviathan ratio measure is not. Low
rates relative to revenue maximization can only imply competition, not collusion. On the other
hand high rates relative to the revenue-maximizing rate imply a lack of competition regardless of
whether the competition is simply absent or whether it is collusive behavior that limits the
competition.
As an analogy, if one were to try to measure the level of competitiveness of a private
industry by examining measures of interdependence in pricing among firms, a high degree of
interdependence could be a sign of either competition or collusion. To know the difference
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requires knowledge, for example, of how much prices are marked up over marginal cost (a
similar measure to our Leviathan ratio).
To better understand our argument, Figure 3.2 shows a four quadrant diagram depicting
the four possible pairings of measures from the spatial dependence measure and the Leviathan
ratio tax rate measure. In the figure, the vertical axis shows the degree of spatial dependence
while the horizontal axis shows the degree to which tax rates correspond to the Leviathan
revenue-maximizing rates.
Figure 3.2: Spatial Dependence vs. Leviathan Tax Rates

High spatial dependence
(large ρ)
I
Low tax rate
relative to
revenuemaximizing rate
(low Leviathan
ratio)

II

Highly competitive
governments

Colluding
governments

Constitutionally
constrained
governments

Local monopoly
governments

III

High tax rate
relative to
revenuemaximizing rate
(high Leviathan
ratio)

IV
Low spatial dependence
(small ρ)

Quadrant I, in the upper left, is the case of a government showing a high degree of spatial
dependence (large ρ) while simultaneously showing a low tax rate relative to the revenuemaximizing rate (low Leviathan ratio). These are highly competitive governments by both
measures, and this is the quadrant in which our estimates for both municipalities and counties in
Pennsylvania fall. Quadrant II, in the upper right, is the case of a government showing a high
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degree of spatial dependence (large ρ) while simultaneously showing a high tax rate relative to
the revenue-maximizing rate (high Leviathan ratio). This would be the sign of collusion among
the governments, and this is the quadrant in which our estimates for Pennsylvania school districts
fall. Quadrant III in the lower left is the case of a government showing a low degree of spatial
dependence (small ρ) while simultaneously showing a low tax rate relative to the revenuemaximizing rate (low Leviathan ratio). These are governments that show no sign of interaction
or competition with neighboring jurisdictions but yet maintain low tax rates despite the lack of
competitive pressures. Because constitutional constraints are the alternative to competition in
keeping Leviathan at bay, this quadrant best reflects these types of governments. Obviously a
government whose tax rates are set constitutionally (and thus inflexibly) at low levels would fall
in this quadrant.
Finally, quadrant IV, in the lower right, is the case of a government showing a low degree
of spatial dependence (small ρ) while simultaneously showing a high tax rate relative to the
revenue-maximizing rate (high Leviathan ratio). Like with quadrant III, the lack of spatial
dependence suggests a lack of either competition or collusion, and is more suggestive of
independent action. However, the high rate relative to the revenue-maximizing rate suggests that
this independent action is not governed by strict constitutional constraints, but the lack of such
constraints. This quadrant is more reflective of a true Leviathan government that sets high rates
and seems immune to competitive pressures, similar to the case of a „local monopoly‟ in a
product market. Most importantly, however, the theory we outline in Figure 3.2 casts substantial
doubt on the ability of spatial econometric estimates of interdependence to measure
intergovernmental competition alone.
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3.9 Conclusion
There is no shortage of empirical studies attempting to uncover whether decentralization
constrains the Leviathan behavior of governments. This literature, however, has found very
mixed results and has been plagued by hard to measure issues related to collusion among
governments, differing constitutional constraints on the governments in the sample, singlepurpose jurisdictions, and a necessitated use of aggregate revenue or government size data.
Further, the widespread adoption of spatial econometric techniques in recent years has led to a
proliferation of new research on intergovernmental competition using estimates of spatial
dependence as measures of tax competition. While all of these previous studies are useful, they
each provide an incomplete picture.
Studies that focus on decentralization‟s impact on government size are assuming strategic
interaction without explicitly testing for it. Similarly, studies using spatial methods and finding
high degrees of spatial dependence blindly assume it is due to intergovernmental competition
and ignore the fact that high interdependence can be caused, alternatively, by collusion. Thus,
models testing only for intergovernmental competition are ignoring its consequences by not
explicitly examining whether the actual tax rates set by these governments are „high‟ or „low‟
relative to the Leviathan revenue-maximizing levels. Our paper joins these two approaches into
one framework. No previous paper has explored both sides within the same study. These
models, when looked at together, provide a coherent framework for studying how
intergovernmental competition which follows from a fiscally decentralized federal system can
lead to constraints on Leviathan behavior.
We investigate the role of fiscal federalism as a constraint on Leviathan through the use
of two models and a unique panel of data for local jurisdictions in Pennsylvania. Importantly,
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we are able to directly examine the tax rates of these jurisdictions, and do not rely on aggregate
measures of revenue or government size as has been done in prior Leviathan studies. We
examine separately a measure of Leviathan rate-setting behavior, and a measure of the degree of
intergovernmental interdependence, for municipal governments, school districts, and county
governments. Previous literature has used some measure of the number of governments as a
measure of decentralization or intergovernmental competition, and by this standard
municipalities (of which there are 2,522 in our sample) should be more competitive than school
districts (of which there are 501 in our sample), which in turn should be more competitive than
counties (of which there are 66 in our sample).
First, we use a Laffer curve methodology to „search‟ for Leviathan behavior at each level
of local government. We obtain point estimates of the tax rates that would maximize tax revenue
for these governments, and then calculate a ratio to measure how far each government is below
these unconstrained Leviathan rates. Our Laffer curve-based Leviathan ratio estimates reveal
that all local jurisdictions (municipalities, counties, and school districts) set tax rates well below
revenue-maximization. As predicted based on the number of governments, these estimates show
that counties are able to set rates closer to Leviathan levels than are municipalities. School
districts, however, do not fit in this ordering; while they should have fallen in the middle, they
are found to have rates the closest to Leviathan revenue maximization among all levels of
government, suggesting that they are the least competitive.
We then turn to a model of spatial dependence to determine the level of strategic
interaction at each level. The spatial model has traditionally been used in the literature as a
measure of intergovernmental competition. We employ it here in this same context, and our
results indicate the presence of significant spatial dependence within all three levels of
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government. As predicted based on the number of governments, these estimates also show that
counties are less interdependent than are municipalities (i.e., suggesting municipalities are more
competitive than counties). School districts, however, again do not fit in this ordering as while
they should have fallen in the middle, they are found to have the highest degree of spatial
interdependence—suggesting that they are the most competitive. This is an interesting finding as
the Leviathan/Laffer curve estimates suggested that school districts were the least competitive.
Overall our findings are important for two reasons. First, based on our county and
municipality results, we are able to confirm the positive role of intergovernmental competition
and fiscal decentralization in constraining the Leviathan behavior of governments. The more
decentralized municipal governments show both more spatial dependence (i.e.,
intergovernmental competition) and lower tax rates (compared to the revenue-maximizing tax
rates) than do the less decentralized county governments. Second, based on our results for
school districts we call into question the popular use of measures of spatial dependence as a
measure of intergovernmental competition. High spatial dependence can be either a sign of high
competition or of its opposite, collusion.
We outline a new theory using both of our measures that incorporates four possible
categories of results. In our framework, high spatial dependence coupled with significantly
lower than revenue-maximizing tax rates is reflective of intergovernmental competition, while
high spatial dependence coupled with tax rates closer (or equal to) revenue-maximizing tax rates
is reflective of intergovernmental collusion. Similarly, low spatial dependence (a sign of
independent action) coupled with significantly lower than revenue-maximizing tax rates is
reflective of strong constitutional constraints, while low spatial dependence coupled with tax
rates closer (or equal to) revenue-maximizing tax rates is reflective of a „local monopoly‟-type
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government that is a true Leviathan insulated from competition. Taken together our results
provide evidence that while federalism, and the competing governments inherent within it, can
limit the ability of government to achieve Leviathan goals, a more complete model is required to
ensure observed intergovernmental interaction is not in fact collusive in nature.
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Chapter 4
Spatial Dependence in Constitutional Constraints: The Case of U.S. States
4.1 Introduction
Since its inception, the field of constitutional political economy has been concerned with the
selection of constitutional constraints on government. From a theoretical standpoint, Buchanan
and Tullock (1962) and Buchanan (1975) have sought to explain the origin of constitutional
constraints. For the most part, empirical studies in the area have been focused more exclusively
on testing the effectiveness of various constitutional rules. To this point, however, little applied
work has been undertaken to examine the origin of specific constitutional structures, chiefly
because of the difficulty in empirically measuring constitutional constraints. Empirical studies
of the origin of constitutional rules are in need of a model with testable implications.
Several theories including the political science concept of diffusion of innovations (which
describes the spread of new rules, policy, etc. between governments) and Holcombe‟s (1994)
contention that constitutions serve as a substitute for mobility suggest that constitutions are
designed at least partially in response to the constitutions in use by neighboring governments.
This idea provides a basis for a model of constitutional design which can be tested directly. In
the present paper I contribute to the constitutional economics literature by performing the first
spatial econometric analysis of constitutional constraints. Further, the primary analysis is
focused on the presence of specific rules in state constitutions, rather than some aggregate
measure, providing insight into the types of constitutional constraints which are most likely to be
dependent on neighbors‟ constraints.
I outline a theory of constitutional design where a state‟s choice of constitutional
constraints is a function of neighboring constitutions by extending Holcombe‟s (1994) argument.
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The theory follows closely previous work on strategic interaction among governments, and is
based in part on a type of „yardstick competition‟ traditionally used to explain tax policy. Unlike
previous normative attempts to explain the choice of constraints, this model is directly testable
using spatial econometric techniques. Further, the model is consistent with the theory of
diffusion of constitutional rules. I employ a spatial probit model estimation of states‟ choice of
nineteen specific constitutional provisions. This approach serves to effectively make
constitutional constraints endogenous, adding to a comparatively underdeveloped strand in the
current literature (Voigt 1997, 2010).
To this point, the majority of the empirical literature on constitutional rules is concerned
with their effectiveness in constraining government. These studies typically focus on specific
constraints or structures and model their success or failure at achieving some stated goal. In
cross-country studies, Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2003, 2004) show two specific types of
constitutional rules, namely those defining electoral rules and the type of government, have
significant impacts on economic outcomes. Blume, Müller, Voigt, and Wolf (2009) extend their
work and confirm the electoral rule result, but contradict the regime-type result.
The empirical literature on the effectiveness of constraints at the state level in the United
States is vast. Some of the specific types of constraints examined include term limits, fiscal
constraints or tax and expenditure limits, the presence of popular initiative, and line-item veto.
While Poterba (1994, 1996) finds that fiscal constraints lead to faster adjustment during crises,
Sobel and Wagner (2006) provide evidence that states use „rainy-day funds‟ to circumvent these
constraints. Gubernatorial term limits have been shown to limit accountability (Besley and Case
1995a). The line-item veto literature provides little evidence supporting its effectiveness (Holtz-
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Eakin 1988; Carter and Schap 1990). Popular initiative, on the other hand, seems to constrain
government (Bails and Tieslau 2000; Matsusaka 1995).
Meanwhile, comparably less applied work has focused on factors leading to adoption of
certain constraints. Notable exceptions include Wibbels (2005) who models constitutional
structure as a function of a variety of factors, specifically inequality at the „constitutional
moment,‟ and Holcombe (1991) who provides evidence that a number of provisions in the U.S.
Constitution were directly attributable to the self interest of the founding fathers. McGuire
(1988) finds similar evidence that the founding fathers voted in support of their own interests as
well as the interests of their constituents. Finally, Boix (1999) shows that electoral systems are
designed in accordance with the interests of the ruling party.
These exceptions notwithstanding, the origin of constraints in the applied literature is an
area ripe for further research. This has been identified by Voigt (1997, 2010) as the future of
constitutional economics, and by Buchanan (1990) as squarely within the „domain‟ of
constitutional political economy. Buchanan differentiates constitutional economics from
traditional economics by emphasizing this choice of constraints rather than traditional choice
subject to constraints. As noted above, the majority of the analysis in the field thus far has been
focused somewhere in between by analyzing the effectiveness of constraints.
This paper adds to the work on the origin of constitutional constraints by outlining and
empirically testing an economic theory of constitutional design. Following Holcombe‟s (1994)
contention that constitutional rules serve as a substitute for mobility, and drawing on the theory
of diffusion of innovations in constitutional design, I employ spatial econometric techniques to
analyze the presence in state constitutions of nineteen specific provisions. The results
demonstrate states‟ constitutions depend significantly on the constitutions of neighboring states.
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This lends credence to the hypothesis that constitutional rules act as a substitute for mobility, and
provides further evidence of diffusion amongst the 48 contiguous states.
The following section motivates the analysis by discussing diffusion of constitutional
rules. Section 3 extends Holcombe‟s (1994) theory of constitutions serving as a substitute for
mobility. Section 4 details the empirical methodology used to test the theory, while Section 5
summarizes the results. The final section provides a conclusion and briefly discusses
implications for future research in constitutional political economy.

4.2 Diffusion of Constitutional Rules
While the majority of the empirical work described above focuses on testing the effectiveness of
constitutional constraints, important work on the origin of such rules is based on the „borrowing‟
of rules (known as diffusion) between governments. This work is primarily devoted to analysis
of historical case studies, with a focus on how particular innovations in constitutional design
spread to other governments or how newly adopted constitutions are similar to or different from
constitutions in place in neighboring jurisdictions. Diffusion of policy or institutions refers to
“the relative speed and the spatial patterns of adoption of new programs” (Walker 1969). Thus,
the theory of diffusion provides a clear basis for spatial dependence in constitutional design.
Holcombe (1991, 1992, 1998) has done extensive work on the constitutional history of
the United States. While not explicitly studying diffusion, this work is clearly in the same vein.
His work looks at the Confederate Constitution and compares it to its neighbor‟s, the U.S.
Constitution. While the Confederate Constitution shares the majority of the features of the U.S.
Constitution (indicating substantial diffusion of the constraints developed by the original
framers) it differs in key ways as well. Specifically, Holcombe notes a significant weakening of
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the Confederacy‟s federal level of government relative to the U.S. federal government, and a
specific prohibition against distributive favoritism to any particular industry (1991, 1992). Thus,
while the majority of provisions in the U.S. Constitution „diffused‟ into the Confederacy, key
features viewed as problematic were rewritten and the Confederate Constitution is viewed as a
stricter set of constraints on government.
Going even further back into American history, Holcombe (1998) provides evidence of
diffusion of constitutional rules from the Iroquois nation to the neighboring thirteen American
colonies. Specifically, key features of the Iroquois constitution were adopted as part of the
Albany Plan (which was never ratified) and later the Articles of Confederation. Specifically, the
Albany Plan borrowed the Iroquois‟s federal system of government. However, the Albany Plan
weakened the unanimity present in the Iroquois system by removing direct accountability.
Similarly, the Articles of Confederation were based on the Albany Plan (and thus the
neighboring Iroquois constitution) with a further weakening of the legislature‟s voting rule.
While Holcombe‟s work focuses on national constitutions, the work of Tarr (1992, 1996,
1998) on state constitutions is of particular interest to the present paper. He notes significant
diffusion of constitutional structure between the U.S. states. A specific example is the „Missouri
Plan‟ for selecting supreme court justices, which was implemented in Missouri in 1940 and later
spread (in one form or another) to more than 30 other states. Tarr also notes regional
characteristics lead to similarities in state constitutions, most notably in the South. State
constitutions also tend to be based in part on previous state constitutions.
Numerous other studies of diffusion across the U.S. states include Gray (1973), Benjamin
(1985) (who explores the diffusion of executive tenure and term limits between the states),
Caldeira (1985) (who looks at the diffusion of votes to adopt amendments to the U.S.
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Constitution), Puro, Bergerson, and Puro (1985) (who test the spread of the Missouri Plan
empirically), Stonecash (1983) (who finds convergence across the states in terms of fiscal
centralization), and Garrett, Wagner, and Wheelock (2005) (who examine spatial dependence in
bank regulation). This borrowing of policies and provisions amongst the states is an issue which
the model presented below directly addresses.

4.3 Constitutions and Mobility
Holcombe (1994) differentiates governments from clubs by defining government as having the
ability to coercively tax all individuals in a given geographic area. This power over all residents
in a location is a defining characteristic of government. While members of a club may quit the
club without physically moving, a resident cannot „quit‟ a government without moving. While
the typical Tiebout (1956) model would predict sorting based on provision of public goods and
services, in a world where movement is costly perfect intergovernmental competition is not
expected.
For this reason, Holcombe describes constitutional rules as a substitute for mobility.
Under a Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) Leviathan government, voters are only able
to escape expropriation through intergovernmental competition or strict constitutional
constraints. When voter-residents are unable to „vote with their feet‟ due to high costs of
moving, their only respite is a binding constitution. In the absence of such constraints, the
Leviathan will seek to maximize its dominance over the citizenry. Knowing this ex ante,
residents (who obviously wish to avoid excessive expropriation by the government) will choose
a state which is either subject to a strict set of constitutional constraints or relatively easy to
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„escape‟ should Leviathan begin to rise. If given the choice, it is unlikely that any resident will
choose a loosely constrained state where mobility into a neighboring state is high cost.
The logic in Holcombe‟s argument can be extended to the choice of constraints. If voterresidents consider constitutions as the substitute for mobility, the state, which wishes to attract
residents, must also consider mobility when designing or amending its constitution. This is
especially true over time, as mobility costs fall and the strictness of the constitution becomes the
major motivating factor in residents‟ choice. If voters are able to move between states at
increasingly lower costs (a fairly safe assumption, especially in the U.S. through time) then
interstate differentials in constitutional strength become paramount, ceteris paribus.
Of course the assumption of perfect mobility is not realistic; voter-residents will always
face a nonzero cost when moving from one state to another. As such, governments will still
enjoy dominion over the geographic area and are not completely constrained by the possibility of
a Tiebout-type exodus of citizens. With some limited mobility, however, the threat of exit into a
neighboring state remains credible.16 Under this realistic assumption, states would be wise to
attempt to preempt this threat by removing the incentive to exit.
When attempting to prevent exit by residents, a state will look to the residents‟ potential
destinations, neighboring states. This follows from the contention that residents observe
neighboring states‟ constitutions and draw comparisons. In the tax competition literature, this is
known as „yardstick competition‟ where states (realizing their choice of policy is measured by
voters against that of other states) choose policy in response to neighboring states (see for
example Besley and Case 1995b, Allers and Elhorst 2005). Specifically, since mobility serves as

16

An interesting unit of analysis for the study of this phenomenon would be cities which form along a state‟s border.
While such an undertaking is beyond the scope of the present paper, it would likely prove to be a worthwhile avenue
for future research. I thank Donald Lacombe for this insight.
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a substitute for constitutional rules states will examine neighboring constitutional structures. Of
course a state could completely remove the threat of exit by instituting an extremely strict
constitution. However, since a Leviathan state wishes to maximize its size, this self-imposed
„chaining‟ is not a viable option. Alternatively, the state can remove the voters‟ incentive to exit
by amending its own constitution to a form comparable to its neighbors‟. In this scenario, voters
no longer see „greener pastures‟ across the border since all nearby states are subject to
constitutions with similar constraints. While a more preferable constitution may exist elsewhere,
the high cost of mobility makes those options nonviable.
In a survey of work on strategic interaction among governments, Brueckner (2003)
outlines two models which explicitly deal with strategic interaction between governments, a type
of which is described above. He refers to one of these models as the „resource-flow model‟ in
that government decisions are partly responsible for the location choice of a particular valuable
resource. In the above discussion, the resource can be thought of as residents, capital
investment, and other sources of tax revenue. The implication of this theory when adopted as a
model of constitutional design is that states will choose constitutional constraints in response to
the choices of neighboring jurisdictions. Since mobility remains costly, however, not all
constitutions will take the same shape. Specifically, states will mimic only those states which
present reasonably low cost alternatives to residents. Further, states will not choose
constitutional rules solely based on neighboring institutions.
Following Brueckner (2003), the state‟s objective function can be summarized in
Equation (4.1):

V ( yi , ri ; X i )
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(4.1)

where yi is the choice of constitutional structure in state i, ri is the amount of the resource present
in i, and Xi, represents other characteristics of state i. Since residents‟ choice of state is based in
part on the constitutional structure in each state (as well as other factors), the resource level in i
can be expressed as

ri  f ( yi , yi ; X i )

(4.2)

with y-i representing the constitutions in all states other than i.17 By substituting Equation (4.2)
into (1), the state‟s objective function becomes

V [ yi , f ( yi , yi ; X i ); X i ]  V ( yi , yi ; X i ) .

(4.3)

States choose yi to maximize V. The solution (found by differentiating V with respect to
yi and setting equal to zero) is a function of a state‟s own characteristics and neighboring
constitutional choices and can be expressed as

yi  R( yi ; X i )

(4.4)

which can be thought of as a constitution reaction function. Thus, states‟ choices of
constitutional rules are dependent on state-specific characteristics as well as the rules chosen by
other states.
If the theory outlined above is valid, states can be expected to design their constitutions at
least in part as a function of neighbors‟ constraints. However, there is no ex ante expectation on
the sign of the slope of the reaction function. Some specific provisions or rules are more likely
to occur in a given state‟s constitution if they are also present in neighboring constitutions. This
would explain the „borrowing‟ of provisions observed by Tarr (1992, 1996, 1998). At the same
time, states may choose to avoid other provisions or rules in an effort to differentiate from

17

If Xi is expressed in relative terms, it is not necessary to include X-i in equation (2). However, X-i can be included
(with Xi in absolute terms) to justify the Spatial Durbin Model presented later in the paper.
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neighboring states or in order to improve upon neighboring constitutions. Holcombe‟s (1991,
1992, 1998) extensive work on American constitutional history details several cases of
governments adopting neighboring constitutions while still making fundamental changes to
provisions which were deemed ineffective or problematic.
I examine the validity of this theory by analyzing state constitutions in the 48 contiguous
states. State constitutions provide a natural unit of analysis in that they are formal documents
which are only subservient to the U.S. Constitution. The state level is also a small enough unit
that the assumption of limited mobility is reasonable. Clearly it remains costly to move between
states, but the cost is doubtlessly far lower than mobility between nations, especially once one
considers the U.S. states share a common language, a common currency, developed
infrastructure, etc. Nevertheless, the costliness of mobility is addressed in two ways. First, the
analysis is focused on the past several years, a period of time over which mobility between the
states has become increasingly easy. Secondly, the cost of mobility is dealt with indirectly in the
specification of the spatial weight matrix detailed in the following section.
As a first look, Figure 4.1 presents descriptive characteristics of state constitutions on a
map of the 48 contiguous states. The maps display, in quintiles, the spatial distribution of basic
constitutional structure including length, age, and number of amendments. These data are
collected from the Council of State Government‟s Book of the States. While these descriptors
are mute on the actual provisions contained in the constitutions, they provide insight into the
complexity, longevity, and malleability of state institutions.
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Figure 4.1: Characteristics of State Constitutions, 2006
Length of Constitution (Words)

Age of Current Constitution (Years)

Number of Amendments to Current Constitution (Adopted)

Quintiles
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At first glance, it appears that longer constitutions (i.e. those with more words) are
clustered in southern states and the west coast. States in the northeast tend to have shorter
constitutions. Older constitutions are found in the northeast and mid-western states, while the
southeast has more recently adopted constitutions. Finally, the number of amendments appears
to be grouped in spatial clusters as well. Though these maps are hardly conclusive evidence of
spatial dependence in state constitutions, they do provide suggestive support. If state
constitutions are similar to neighbors in terms of basic structure, it likely follows that they are
similar in terms of the constraints contained within them. Testing the spatial dependence of
specific constitutional provisions is the task of the empirical analysis detailed in the next section.

4.4 Empirical Model and Methodology
Since the incidence of a specific rule or provision in a constitution is a binary variable, I employ
a probit model. As the theory discussed above details a process whereby adoption of a rule
depends partly on neighbor‟s adoption, I consider a spatial econometric approach. The
theoretical constitution reaction function described by Equation (4.4) takes no specific functional
form. Therefore, I employ two spatial models and use Bayesian model comparison techniques to
produce posterior model probabilities. The highest of these probabilities indicates the most
appropriate model. The first of these models is a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model. This
models the presence of a rule in a state‟s constitution as a function of the presence (or lack
thereof) of the same provision in neighboring constitutions. This same approach is employed by
Fiva and Rattsø (2007) who analyze spatial dependence in adoption of property taxation and Hall
and Ross (forthcoming) who look at yardstick competition in income tax adoption. Specifically,
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the spatial autoregressive probit (which is fully developed in LeSage and Pace 2009) takes the
form

yi*    wyi*  xi    i

(4.5)

where the binary choice variable, yi, is determined by the latent variable, y i *, as follows

1 if yi*  0
yi  
.
*
0 if yi  0
The choice variable yi takes a value of 1 if a state‟s constitution contains a given provision and a
value of 0 if it does not. A description of the nineteen specific rules on which this equation is
estimated is presented at the end of this section.
Variable α is an intercept term. The variable xi serves as a control for voter preferences
and other economic conditions which may influence the presence constitutional rules. The
matrix w is an (n x n) spatial weight matrix which weights the choices of neighboring states, and
the parameter ρ is a scalar which indicates the degree of spatial dependence. If the estimated
value of ρ is significant, spatial dependence is present. The weight matrix used in this analysis is
based on contiguity: states are considered neighbors if they share a common border.18 As
mentioned previously, mobility between states is costly. This analysis is focused only on
contiguous neighbors under the assumption that it is easier to move to a neighboring state. Ex
ante, the parameter ρ may take either a positive or negative value. Positive spatial dependence
indicates the presence of a constitutional provision in a neighboring state increases the likelihood
of a given state‟s constitution containing the same provision. Negative spatial dependence would
indicate differentiation. In either case, nonzero spatial dependence provides evidence that states
are responding to one another in constitutional choice.

18

Contiguity is determined using latitude and longitude coordinates and Delaunay triangles.
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Equation (4.5) above can be extended into a panel framework. This procedure follows
Elhorst (2009) who develops the spatial autoregressive panel model and directly to Garrett,
Wagner, and Wheelock (2005) who develop a spatial autoregressive probit model for panel data.
The N cross-sectional observations of Equation (4.5) are compiled into vectors comprising all T
time periods such that

Yt*    WYt*  X t    t

(4.6)

where Yt*  ( y1*t , y2*t ,, y *N t ) , X t*  ( x1*t , x2*t ,, x*N t ) , and  t*  (1*t ,  2*t ,,  N* t ) . W is a (TNxTN)
block diagonal matrix with the (NxN) matrix w on the main diagonal. This ensures only
contemporaneous spatial autocorrelation. The implied data generating process is found by
rewriting Equation (4.6) in reduced form

Yt*  (I n  W ) 1 (  X t    t ) .

(4.7)

The matrix Xt contains variables which act as proxies for economic conditions and the
preferences of voter-residents. Specifically, the explanatory variables included are the state‟s
population, the proportion of the population 5-17 years old as well as the proportion over age 65,
the proportion of the population living below the poverty line, the proportion of high school
graduates, and the proportion that is white. These variables are fairly commonly used as controls
for preferences. There is no ex ante prediction for the sign or significance of these control
variables. Also included in the Xt matrix is a variable representing the age of the state‟s
constitution, in years. The inclusion of this variable will control for the potential of certain
provisions being more or less common in older or more recently adopted constitutions. Finally,
following Holcombe‟s (1991, 1992, 1998) work on the constitutional history of the United
States, the Xt matrix includes an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 for states that were

95

part of the Confederate States of America, since thee states share a common constitutional
history.19
The second model considered is the spatial Durbin model (SDM). Hall and Ross
(forthcoming) develop a SDM probit model. The SDM differs from the basic SAR model by
including an additional term, wxi, which geographically weights neighbors‟ characteristics.
Theoretically, this can be justified by modifying Equation (4.2) to include neighboring
characteristics in the resource‟s location decision

ri  f ( yi , yi ; X i , X i )

(4.8)

which subsequently changes the reaction function

yi  R( yi ; X i , X i ) .

(4.9)

When Equation (4.5) is augmented with the additional term, the model becomes

yi*    wyi*  xi   wxi   i

(4.10)

with γ an additional set of parameters to be estimated. As before, in a panel setting, Equation
(4.10) becomes

Yt*    WYt*  X t   WX t   t

(4.11)

Yt*  (I n  W ) 1 (  X t   WX t   t ) .

(4.12)

which in reduced form is

Note that Equation (4.12) is identical to Equation (4.7) except for the inclusion of the additional
matrix of explanatory variables, γWXt. This implies that the estimation strategy employed for the
SAR model may also be used in the SDM.
19

In general, former Confederate States have had a far greater number of constitutions than similarly-aged Northern
states. Confederate States each adopted new constitutions following secession, asserting their place in the newly
formed Confederate States of America. Following the end of the American Civil War, these states again adopted
new constitutions rejoining the United States. Many adopted yet another constitution following Reconstruction.
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LeSage and Pace (2009) provide a compelling argument for the use of the SDM
approach. Specifically, they show that if omitted variables exhibit spatial dependence the
implied data generating process is identical to that of the SDM model. The SDM model, then,
may be used to produce consistent estimates even in the presence of spatially dependent omitted
variables which are correlated with included explanatory variables. Further, if the SDM
approach is used in the unlikely event that no omitted variables exist, estimates are still
consistent (though not efficient). Thus, the use of the SDM here may be viewed as a method of
controlling for spatial dependence in any omitted variables, and if such dependence exists, the
SDM estimates will be preferred to those of the SAR model described above. For example,
„culture‟ may play a role in constitutional design, and is most likely spatially dependent. Since
this variable is likely correlated with the Confederate State variables included in the model, the
SDM approach will be expected to produce consistent estimates.
Maximum likelihood estimation of limited dependent variable models in a spatial context
is quite difficult. Fortunately, LeSage and Pace (2009) provide a Bayesian technique to estimate
spatial probit models. The method is based on a Markov Chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) approach,
and uses a Gibbs sampler algorithm. This is the same technique employed in Fiva and Rattsø
(2007). The key feature of the approach is the sampling of the conditional distribution of the
latent variable, y*. By treating the latent variable as another parameter to be estimated, this
approach greatly simplifies estimation. In general, the Gibbs sampler algorithm is made up of
the following steps: estimate the vector β given assumed values for all other parameters, estimate
ρ given all other parameters, and finally estimate the latent variable y* given all other parameters.
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Parameter estimates come from the mean of the empirical distributions built by the MCMC
process.20
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics

Constitutional Rule Variables: 1998-2005
Age of Constitution
Government Structure
Governor Term Limit
Legislature Term Limit
Supreme Court Justices Elected
Supreme Court Justices Appointed
Supreme Court Justices Merit System
Recall Provision
Home Rule Provision
Constitution Amended by Convention
Direct Democracy Provision

Mean
Standard Deviation
104.667
52.171
0.750
0.349
0.458
0.521
0.438
0.354
0.776
0.813
0.667

0.434
0.477
0.499
0.500
0.497
0.479
0.417
0.391
0.472

0.630
0.307
0.875
0.643
0.208
0.107
0.164
0.167
0.354
0.063

0.483
0.462
0.331
0.480
0.407
0.309
0.371
0.373
0.479
0.242

Fiscal and Social Constraints
Balanced Budget Requirement
Tax/Expenditure Limit
Line Item Veto
Victims' Bill of Rights
Health and Welfare Provision
Official Language Specified
Right to Privacy Specified
Environment Provision
Sexual Discrimination Provision
Abortion Provision
Demographic and Economic Variables:
1998-2005
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Mean
Standard Deviation
5.914
6.320
0.183
0.011
0.126
0.016
0.117
0.031
0.854
0.040
0.841
0.095
0.229
0.421

Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for all data used in this study. All explanatory
variables and constitutional data span the 8 year period of 1998-2005. The choice of
20

A full description of the Gibbs sampler and Bayesian econometric technique employed is well beyond the scope
of this paper. The interested reader is pointed to LeSage and Pace (2009) who provide a full treatment of the
methodology. Fiva and Rattsø (2007) also provide an excellent summary of the procedure.
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constitutional rules to be modeled is expansive, and includes the majority of the constraints
mentioned in the previous literature (such as line-item veto, term limits, and balanced budget
requirements) as well as additional constraints heretofore not extensively studied (such as the
right to privacy). In total, nineteen specific constitutional provisions are considered, nine of
which can be viewed broadly as rules concerning the structure of state government, and ten
which serve as fiscal and social constraints. The most prevalent constitutional rule in the data is
the line item veto, present in 87.5% of state-year observations. An explicit mention of abortion
in the state constitution is the least prevalent provision, with only 6.3% of state-year
observations.
All constitutional rule variables take a value of 1 if the state constitution explicitly
contains a provision of the type in the given year. This methodology then tests for existence of
the rule and not adoption. Statutory rules and other provisions not explicitly contained in the
constitution are not considered. The balanced budget requirement examined is one which
requires the legislature pass a balanced budget. All tax and expenditure limits, provided they are
codified in the constitution, are considered. Direct democracy refers to the availability of
popular initiatives of any type (statute or constitutional amendment). The methods of supreme
court justice selection include all mechanisms available in the state. Since justices can still be
appointed in states with a merit system (when a vacancy first appears, for example) several states
have multiple selection rules specified in their constitutions.
Data on provisions in state constitutions comes from Maddex (1998, 2003) and is updated
with reports from the National Conference of State Legislatures. Information on the selection
rules for supreme court justices comes from the American Judicature Society‟s “Judicial
Selection in the States” material. State population and the proportions elderly, young, and white
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come from the Census Bureau‟s population estimates and volumes of the Statistical Abstract of
the United States. Data on the proportion of the state population that lives below the poverty line
and the proportion of high school graduates comes from the Census Bureau‟s Current Population
Survey.

4.5 Results
Results from the estimation of the spatial autoregressive probit models for nineteen specific
constitutional provisions are found in Tables 4.2 and 4.3. Table 4.2 shows results for the
government structure provisions while Table 4.3 includes the fiscal and social constraints.
Estimates are based on 384 observations of the 48 contiguous states over the period 1998-2005.
I employ a Bayesian estimation technique following that described in LeSage and Pace (2009)
and Fiva and Rattsø (2007) featuring 3500 MCMC draws based on a Gibbs sampling
algorithm.21 The first 500 draws are omitted as part of the „burn-in‟ by the sampler.
Experiments with up to 11000 draws (with the first 1000 omitted) yielded nearly identical
results.22 I employ diffuse priors in the estimation.23 When interpreting coefficients in a
Bayesian context, credible intervals are used. In the tables which follow, the 95% credible
interval is presented. Functionally, the 95% credible interval is analogous to a 5% confidence

21

A full treatment of the Bayesian estimation of the spatial autoregressive probit model can be found in LeSage and
Pace (2009) Chapter 10. The models were estimated using the „sarp_g‟ function found in LeSage‟s spatial
econometrics toolbox, available at http://www.spatial-econometrics.com.
22

While the results are nearly identical, the time needed for computation increases greatly. As such, I present the
results based on fewer MCMC draws as my primary findings.
23

Diffuse priors are also known as uninformative priors and indicate uncertainty about the expected values of the
parameters. Specifically, the assumed prior mean for the β coefficients is zero, the prior variance of β is very large,
and the parameter ρ has a range of [-1,1]. For more information on the role of priors in Bayesian estimation, see
LeSage and Pace (2009).

100

interval in traditional econometric models; a parameter estimate can be said to be nonzero (with
a 95% probability) if the credible interval does not contain zero.
Table 4.2: Spatial Autoregressive Probit Models: Government Structure
Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Governor Term
Limit

Legislature Term
Limit

Justices Elected

Justices
Appointed

Justices Merit
System

0.505*
[0.298, 0.679]

0.234*
[0.007, 0.440]

0.480*
[0.284, 0.658]

0.629*
[0.482, 0.762]

0.299*
[0.071, 0.510]

-0.002*
[-0.004, -0.001]
-0.039*
[-0.064, -0.022]
-4.655
[-13.810, 3.487]
-3.386
[-10.662, 2.719]
4.263*
[0.661, 8.160]
-1.105
[-4.330, 1.758]
-2.807*
[-5.043, -1.120]
-0.251
[-0.601, 0.044]

-0.001
[-0.003, 0.000]
0.015*
[0.005, 0.026]
11.096*
[4.974, 17.452]
5.075*
[0.485, 10.116]
6.067*
[3.519, 8.883]
5.051*
[2.765, 7.684]
0.761
[-0.131, 1.765]
0.014
[-0.191, 0.215]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.001]
-0.002
[-0.005, 0.001]
1.457
[-7.900, 10.535]
-4.907
[-11.538, 1.417]
10.638*
[6.624, 15.488]
0.023
[-3.132, 3.219]
1.222
[-0.154, 2.615]
-0.047
[-0.324, 0.226]

Recall

Home Rule

Amend by
Convention

Direct
Democracy

0.302*
[0.083, 0.504]

-0.357*
[-0.563, -0.150]

-0.846*
[-0.997, -0.508]

0.526*
[0.342, 0.698]

-0.004*
[-0.006, -0.002]
0.001
[-0.010, 0.012]
-2.677
[-9.546, 3.642]
-10.942*
[-16.393, -5.861]
1.890
[-0.731, 4.658]
2.136
[-0.238, 4.585]
0.110
[-0.937, 1.044]
-0.396*
[-0.633, -0.179]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.001]
0.038*
[0.026, 0.050]
-0.445
[-3.016, 2.285]
2.908*
[0.453, 5.429]
2.481*
[1.294, 3.594]
1.324*
[0.310, 2.367]
0.010
[-0.353, 0.392]
-0.338*
[-0.422, -0.248]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.001]
-0.002
[-0.005, 0.001]
-2.679*
[-5.050, -0.443]
-3.132*
[-5.022, -1.560]
0.953*
[0.001, 1.885]
0.847*
[0.042, 1.665]
0.070
[-0.210, 0.362]
-0.096*
[-0.157, -0.034]

-0.000
[-0.002, 0.001]
-0.022*
[-0.041, -0.008]
21.952*
[12.718, 32.765]
11.938*
[5.888, 19.457]
7.951*
[4.485, 12.360]
6.122*
[3.429, 9.020]
-3.074*
[-4.763, -1.763]
-0.744*
[-1.116, -0.475]

0.005*
-0.004*
[0.002, 0.009]
[-0.005, -0.002]
0.007
-0.039*
[-0.012, 0.027]
[-0.055, -0.024]
7.741
5.592
[-4.525, 20.549] [-0.0989, 12.612]
12.460*
4.961*
[3.550, 22.419]
[0.373, 10.198]
-6.621*
0.761
[-11.876, -1.764] [-1.890, 3.456]
-2.400
0.125
[-6.858, 1.584]
[-2.260, 2.208]
-1.582
2.736*
[-3.514, 0.170]
[1.654, 4.140]
-0.599*
0.027
[-0.988, -0.249]
[-0.194, 0.234]

Number of Observations: 384
NOTE: Estimates based on 3000 draws. Total effect [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and Pace (2009)] estimates shown for
explanatory variables. 95% credible interval in brackets. * indicates 95% credible interval does not contain zero. Estimated value of
constant not shown.

The coefficient estimates reported in Tables 4.2 and 4.3 are the total effect estimates for
each parameter. These total effect estimates include the direct and indirect effects a la LeSage
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and Pace (2009). Significant spatial dependence (ρ) is found in all of the government structure
specifications. Specifically, both gubernatorial and legislature term limits exhibit positive spatial
dependence, as do provisions for election, appointment, and merit system selection of supreme
court justices. In other words, a state‟s constitution is more likely to limit the number of terms a
governor or legislator may serve, and is more likely to choose appointment, election, or merit
system selection of justices if a neighboring state does. States are also more likely to allow for
voter recall of government officials if neighboring states‟ constitutions contain similar
provisions. Direct democracy provisions also exhibit positive spatial dependence. Taken
together, these results suggest that states place restrictions on government officials similar to
those in surrounding states.
Provisions for home rule and constitutional amendment by convention exhibit significant
negative spatial dependence. These results suggest a differentiating of states from neighboring
constitutions for these two provisions.
The first several columns of Table 4.3 present estimates for the fiscal constraints. While
significant negative spatial dependence is found in the tax and expenditure limit specification,
the 95% credible interval for ρ in the balanced budget requirement specification contains zero.
However, if the credible interval is reduced to 90%, the negative spatial dependence becomes
significant. Significant negative spatial dependence is found in the line item veto specification
as well. This negative dependence can again be interpreted as states‟ attempting to differentiate
from neighboring institutions.
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Table 4.3: Spatial Autoregressive Probit Models: Fiscal and Social Constraints
Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Balanced Budget

TEL

Line Item Veto

Victims' Bill of
Rights

Health and
Welfare

-0.290
[-0.598, 0.006]

-0.370*
[[-0.743, -0.016]

-0.906*
[-0.997, -0.723]

0.251*
[0.026, 0.451]

0.313*
[0.023, 0.596]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.001]
-0.007*
[-0.014, -0.001]
3.279
[-1.136, 7.755]
-1.942
[-5.178, 1.024]
0.380
[-1.309, 2.013]
-1.061
[-2.565, 0.332]
-0.323
[-0.891, 0.247]
-0.234*
[-0.345, -0.113]

-0.002*
[-0.002, -0.001]
0.008*
[0.004, 0.014]
-1.594
[-5.372, 2.187]
-0.387
[-2.888, 2.077]
-0.808
[-2.174, 0.642]
-2.186*
[-3.500, -1.016]
-0.180
[-0.646, 0.313]
-0.031
[-0.136, 0.068]

-0.000
[-0.000, 0.000]
0.013*
[0.008, 0.019]
1.653*
[0.129, 3.184]
3.005*
[1.670, 4.439]
1.888*
[1.136, 2.706]
1.411*
[0.841, 1.953]
-0.452*
[-0.747, -0.201]
-0.076*
[-0.135, -0.018]

-0.002*
[-0.003, -0.001]
0.014*
[0.002, 0.029]
14.088*
[7.706, 20.839]
-4.295
[-9.389, 0.020]
-1.597
[-3.997, 0.683]
-1.064
[-3.139, 0.906]
-1.048*
[-2.006, -0.107]
-0.057
[-0.256, 0.136]

-0.000
[-0.002, 0.001]
0.031*
[0.019, 0.049]
-3.567
[-10.474, 2.274]
-0.424
[-4.767, 3.861]
1.798
[-0.325, 4.321]
-2.227*
[-4.529, -0.369]
-0.325
[-1.245, 0.509]
-0.228*
[-0.452, -0.059]

Environment

Sexual
Discrimination

Abortion

Official Language Right to Privacy

0.230
[-0.170, 0.632]

0.492*
[0.158, 0.746]

-0.707*
[-0.965, -0.385]

0.282*
[0.045, 0.488]

-0.934*
[-0.998, -0.791]

0.001
[-0.000, 0.002]
0.018*
[0.009, 0.036]
1.026
[-3.200, 6.503]
1.379
[-1.197, 4.747]
0.640
[-1.166, 2.907]
2.361*
[0.372, 6.128]
0.305
[-0.290, 0.994]
0.232*
[0.074, 0.522]

-0.005*
[-0.010, -0.002]
0.027*
[0.014, 0.052]
6.550
[-0.435, 15.121]
3.487
[-1.179, 10.069]
6.488*
[3.156, 11.431]
5.374*
[2.433, 9.991]
-0.656
[-1.800, 0.316]
-0.028
[-0.281, 0.172]

-0.001*
[-0.001, -0.000]
0.008*
[0.005, 0.011]
-4.720*
[-7.342, -2.244]
-1.357*
[-2.782, -0.065]
1.714*
[0.821, 2.610]
0.895*
[0.169, 1.692]
-0.081
[-0.386, 0.207]
0.035
[-0.019, 0.087]

-0.003*
[-0.005, -0.002]
0.016*
[0.006, 0.028]
-0.576
[-7.134, 5.820]
-13.863*
[-20.238, -8.740]
-1.428
[-3.914, 1.013]
-0.626
[-2.837, 1.720]
0.162
[-0.710, 1.019]
-0.464*
[-0.689, -0.254]

-0.000*
[-0.001, -0.000]
-0.007*
[-0.014, -0.003]
-2.480*
[-3.924, -1.191]
-3.052*
[-4.839, -1.662]
0.234
[-0.267, 0.725]
-0.479*
[-0.821, -0.164]
0.879*
[0.510, 1.305]
0.117*
[0.066, 0.173]

Number of Observations: 384
NOTE: Estimates based on 3000 draws. Total effect [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and Pace (2009)] estimates shown for
explanatory variables. 95% credible interval in brackets. * indicates 95% credible interval does not contain zero. Estimated value of
constant not shown.

Turning to social constraints, constitutional protection of crime victims‟ rights exhibits
positive spatial dependence: a state‟s constitution is more likely to include a so-called „victims‟
bill of rights‟ if neighboring constitutions contain such provisions. Similarly, constitutional
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health and welfare provisions and an explicit mention of a right to privacy in a state‟s
constitution exhibits positive spatial dependence as well, as does an explicit mention of sexual
discrimination. Provisions concerning the environment and abortion both exhibit negative
spatial dependence, again indicative of differentiation. No spatial relationship is found in
provisions for an official language. Again, these results are largely consistent with the theory
discussed above. States‟ choice of specific constraints, be them fiscal or social, are largely based
on the contents of neighboring constitutions.
Tables 4.4 and 4.5 present results analogous to those discussed above estimated using the
SDM framework. Again, these models follow the autoregressive process like the SAR model,
but include spatially weighted explanatory variables as well. As before, the first set of results
(Table 4.4) present the estimates for the government structure variables. The results differ
somewhat from the SAR estimates. All three justice selection methods still exhibit positive
spatial dependence, as does the provision for direct democracy. Amendment by convention
exhibits negative spatial dependence, again as was the case in the SAR estimation. Governor
and legislature term limits, however, no longer show signs of spatial dependence, though the ρ
parameter in the governor term limit specification remains significant if the credible interval is
reduced from 95% to 90%. Home rule no longer exhibits spatial dependence at the 95% level,
but if the credible interval is reduced to 90% negative dependence is observed. Recall provisions
no longer exhibit spatial dependence. While fewer provisions demonstrate a spatial relationship
in the SDM model than did in the SAR model, there is still clear evidence of interaction between
neighboring governments with six of the nine provisions tested exhibiting spatial dependence.
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Table 4.4: Spatial Durbin Probit Models: Government Structure
Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Governor Term
Limit

Legislature Term
Limit

Justices Elected

Justices Appointed

Justices Merit
System

0.276
[-0.003, 0.522]

-0.010
[-0.298, 0.265]

0.557*
[0.367, 0.720]

0.724*
[0.581, 0.839]

0.387*
[0.142, 0.588]

-0.001
[-0.002, 0.000]
-0.020*
[-0.034, -0.008]
-7.332*
[-16.892, -0.449]
2.712
[-2.256, 8.160]
2.176
[-0.721, 5.243]
3.119*
[0.390, 6.476]
-2.148*
[-3.897, -0.879]
-0.571*
[-1.013, -0.255]

-0.001
[-0.002, 0.000]
0.021*
[0.012, 0.033]
-1.365
[-6.391, 3.173]
4.614*
[1.317, 8.726]
1.002
[-1.068, 2.981]
5.514*
[3.236, 8.208]
0.162
[-0.660, 1.066]
0.160
[-0.028, 0.375]

-0.005*
[-0.009, -0.002]
-0.013
[-0.035, 0.007]
-2.244
[-16.904, 12.005]
-9.835*
[-20.007, -1.197]
12.422*
[6.324, 20.578]
-0.264
[-5.279, 4.441]
1.999*
[0.021, 4.312]
0.126
[-0.322, 0.590]

0.010*
[0.005, 0.017]
0.035*
[0.003, 0.074]
11.245
[-10.442, 34.093]
23.431*
[8.484, 41.527]
-10.642*
[-21.313, -2.472]
-1.892
[-9.550, 5.755]
-2.152
[-5.568, 0.922]
-1.693*
[-2.843, -0.846]

-0.005*
[-0.007, -0.003]
-0.046*
[-0.075, -0.024]
-10.946*
[-20.989, -2.469]
6.257*
[0.590, 12.964]
-7.066*
[-11.775, -3.163]
-0.062
[-3.261, 3.135]
2.502*
[0.865, 4.630]
-0.331*
[-0.700, -0.012]

Recall

Home Rule

Amend by
Convention

Direct Democracy

0.151
[-0.265, 0.500]

-0.380
[-0.772, 0.002]

-0.974*
[-1.000, -0.905]

0.359*
[0.116, 0.599]

-0.003*
[-0.006, -0.002]
-0.006
[-0.022, 0.005]
-10.356*
[-22.334, -2.322]
-12.463*
[-20.591, -6.850]
-2.169
[-6.470, 0.860]
-2.668*
[-6.048, -0.098]
-1.003
[-2.744, 0.119]
0.0227
[-0.205, 0.331]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.001]
0.043*
[0.028, 0.061]
-1.789
[-5.589, 1.140]
3.005*
[0.339, 5.866]
1.444*
[0.058, 2.828]
1.186*
[0.047, 2.394]
-0.011
[-0.571, 0.468]
-0.229*
[-0.371, -0.115]

-0.002*
[-0.002, -0.002]
0.013*
[0.009, 0.016]
-3.019*
[-5.561, -0.688]
-6.018*
[-7.670, -4.278]
-0.278
[-1.042, 0.440]
1.440*
[0.700, 2.134]
-0.007
[-0.289, 0.252]
0.108*
[0.038, 0.178]

-0.001*
[-0.003, -0.000]
-0.024*
[-0.041, -0.012]
3.544
[-8.409, 15.964]
13.375*
[7.300, 21.951]
0.357
[-2.790, 3.527]
1.402
[-1.240, 4.017]
-5.160*
[-7.557, -3.484]
-0.809*
[-1.221, -0.516]

Number of Observations: 384
NOTE: Estimates based on 3000 draws. Total effect [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and Pace (2009)] estimates shown for explanatory
variables. 95% credible interval in brackets. * indicates 95% credible interval does not contain zero. Estimated value of constant not shown.
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Table 4.5: Spatial Durbin Models: Fiscal and Social Constraints
Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Dependent Variable
Spatial Dependence
ρ
Explanatory Variables
Age of Constitution
Population (millions)
Proportion 5-17
Proportion 65+
Proportion Below Poverty Line
Proportion (18+) High School Graduates
Proportion White
Confederate State

Balanced Budget

TEL

Line Item Veto

Victims' Bill of
Rights

Health and
Welfare

-0.575*
[-0.870, -0.265]

-0.861*
[-0.996, -0.585]

-0.754*
[-0.988, -0.351]

-0.027
[-0.384, 0.302]

0.455*
[0.148, 0.722]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.001]
-0.003
[-0.009, 0.003]
2.387
[-1.593, 6.742]
-1.687
[-4.280, 0.814]
-1.266
[-3.001, 0.449]
-1.580*
[-3.008, -0.161]
-0.513
[-1.116, 0.092]
-0.595
[-0.177, 0.057]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.001]
0.012*
[0.009, 0.016]
-3.078*
[-6.401, -0.457]
-1.037
[-2.677, 0.628]
-1.830*
[-2.914, -0.757]
-1.119*
[-1.986, -0.237]
-0.036
[-0.432, 0.345]
-0.071
[-0.144, 0.002]

-0.001*
[-0.001, -0.001]
0.019*
[0.012, 0.028]
-0.396
[-2.613, 1.277]
4.457*
[2.397, 8.056]
0.517
[-0.215, 1.254]
2.352*
[1.485, 3.565]
-0.128
[-0.503, 0.175]
-0.074
[-0.168, 0.001]

-0.001*
[-0.002, -0.000]
-0.005
[-0.014, 0.004]
11.640*
[5.794, 19.145]
0.360
[-2.643, 3.657]
-3.695*
[-6.985, -1.181]
-2.715*
[-5.104, -0.641]
-1.858*
[-3.085, -0.864]
0.081
[-0.090, 0.259]

-0.001
[-0.003, 0.001]
0.046*
[0.025, 0.082]
3.530
[-6.775, 15.493]
1.619
[-3.833, 7.827]
1.231
[-2.478, 5.358]
-4.308*
[-9.435, -0.967]
-0.286
[-1.606, 0.893]
-0.610*
[-1.234, -0.271]

Environment

Sexual
Discrimination

Abortion

-0.402
[-0.857, 0.379]

0.664*
[0.488, 0.804]

-0.758*
[-0.406, -0.987]

-0.010*
[-0.016, -0.005]
0.050*
[0.017, 0.101]
18.973
[-1.214, 44.208]
-30.762*
[-49.437, -16.568]
1.681
[-4.934, 8.768]
-4.452
[-10.986, 1.684]
-0.611
[-2.864, 1.718]
-2.253*
[-3.590, -1.327]

-0.003*
[-0.001, -0.000]
-0.012*
[-0.021, -0.007]
-1.956*
[-3.755, -0.757]
-1.335*
[-2.860, -0.393]
0.707*
[0.190, 1.557]
-0.222
[-0.695, 0.265]
0.563*
[0.263, 0.998]
0.048*
[0.001, 0.099]

Official Language Right to Privacy

-0.472*
[-0.904, -0.065]
0.001*
[0.000, 0.002]
0.022*
[0.013, 0.034]
-3.776*
[-7.383, -1.349]
-0.941
[-2.362, 0.300]
-0.848*
[-1.793, -0.111]
1.442*
[0.509, 2.465]
0.285
[-0.001, 0.775]
-0.001
[-0.107, 0.089]

0.472
[-0.371, 0.770]

-0.007*
-0.001*
[-0.016, -0.001] [-0.003, -0.000]
0.047*
0.012*
[0.018, 0.097]
[0.006, 0.033]
-0.162
-8.979*
[-8.013, 7.385] [-18.629, -4.051]
14.820*
-0.561
[1.227, 35.772]
[-4.241, 1.607]
-1.098
4.160*
[-4.014, 1.086]
[1.765, 11.579]
5.486*
1.985*
[1.422, 11.185]
[0.508, 5.802]
-4.333*
-0.105
[-10.528, -0.433] [-0.670, 0.428]
-0.046
0.141*
[-0.461, 0.245]
[0.033, 0.291]

Number of Observations: 384
NOTE: Estimates based on 3000 draws. Total effect [direct plus indirect effects, see LeSage and Pace (2009)] estimates shown for explanatory
variables. 95% credible interval in brackets. * indicates 95% credible interval does not contain zero. Estimated value of constant not shown.

Table 4.5 presents SDM estimates for the ten fiscal and social constraints. The balanced
budget requirement, tax and expenditure limits, and line item veto provisions show negative
spatial dependence, as was the case in the SAR models (with the balanced budget specification‟s
ρ estimate 95% credible interval no longer containing zero). Similarly, environmental and
abortion provisions continue to exhibit negative spatial dependence, though the spatial
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relationship in environmental rules is only present with a 90% credible interval. Sexual
discrimination provisions exhibit positive spatial dependence, consistent with the SAR
estimation, as does the health and welfare provision.
The SDM estimation yields evidence of spatial dependence in the presence of an official
language in state constitutions, which was not found in the SAR estimation. Notably absent in
the SDM results is spatial dependence in the victims‟ bill or rights and the right to privacy, both
of which showed a spatial relationship in the SAR model.
As before, the inclusion of the spatially weighted explanatory variables led to a reduction
in the number of provisions exhibiting spatial dependence, though others, such as balanced
budget and official language provisions, now show evidence of a spatial relationship. While
fewer fiscal and social constraints exhibit spatial dependence than in the SAR model, clear
evidence still exists that state constitutions are correlated in space. Seven of the ten rules
considered exhibit spatial dependence at the 95% credible level, with an additional constraint
providing weaker evidence at the 90% credible level.
Bayesian estimation allows for a unique type of model comparison. Specifically, the
technique (which is described in detail in LeSage and Pace (2009)) involves comparing the
posterior model probabilities of the SAR and SDM models presented above for each
constitutional rule individually. The posterior model probability comes from an application of
Bayes‟ rule, and can be thought of as the probability of a model‟s „correctness‟ given the data.
Since the SDM model is a special case of the SAR model, comparison of the SDM to the SAR
essentially test for the validity of including the spatially weighted explanatory variables. For all
nineteen rules considered, the SDM model far outperforms the SAR model.
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Taken together, these results strongly support the hypothesis that state constitutions are
designed in response to neighboring institutions. Further, they provide additional evidence of
diffusion of constitutional provisions between neighboring states. Both probit model estimations
provide clear evidence that state constitutional provisions concerning supreme court justice
selection, direct democracy, constitutional amendment by convention, tax and expenditure limits,
line item veto, health and welfare, sexual discrimination, and abortion are related to the presence
of the rule in neighboring states‟ constitutions. Further, provisions for both gubernatorial and
legislative term limits, recall, home rule, balanced budget requirements, victims‟ rights, official
language, privacy, and environmental protection all exhibit spatial dependence in at least one of
the models estimated, lending additional credence to the theory.

4.6 Conclusion
Both Holcombe‟s (1994) argument that constitutions serve as a substitute for mobility and the
phenomenon of policy and institutional diffusion suggest that state constitutions can be based, at
least in part, on the constitutions of neighboring states. This paper presents a theory of
constitutional design where states respond to neighboring states‟ choice of constraints in a
manner similar to „yardstick competition.‟ The theory proposed above is uniquely testable using
spatial econometric methods, and effectively makes constitutional rules endogenous, adding to a
relatively underdeveloped area in the constitutional political economy literature (Voigt 1997,
2010).
A state government‟s power over its residents is limited by both constitutional constraint
and the geographic boundaries which determine its domain. Voter-residents, then, are able to
escape a government‟s reach either by imposing stricter constraints or crossing the border into a
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neighboring state. Over time as mobility costs fall, especially between neighboring states,
interstate constitutional differentials become an important factor in resident choice. As a result
of this, states are likely to turn to neighbors when choosing constitutional structure.
The analysis is based on two spatial econometric models tested on nineteen specific
constitutional provisions. The results provide clear evidence of spatial dependence in state
constitutions, consistent with the proposed theory. Specifically, all nineteen rules analyzed
exhibited spatial dependence in at least one of the probit models considered, with more than half
of the rules showing dependence in both models.
This paper adds to the constitutional political economy literature in several ways. While
a great deal of normative work has been done on constitutional design, less applied empirical
research on the choice of constitutional constraints exists. This paper provides the first spatial
econometric analysis of U.S. state constitutional structure. Further, the primary analysis focuses
on specific provisions rather than aggregate measures of constitutional constraints. Hopefully,
the findings discussed above help to spur on additional work in this area.
Additionally, these results speak to the importance of considering neighboring
institutions when analyzing constitutional constraints. A straightforward implication of the
present paper is that not only is the origin of constitutional rules a function of neighboring
institutions, but so too is their effectiveness. As the majority of the constitutional constraint
literature is concerned with the effectiveness of certain rules, consideration of these questions in
a spatial framework would seem to be a fruitful area for future research.
Finally, the results of this empirical investigation have important implications for
constitutional reform. Since states‟ constitutions are based in part on neighboring constitutions,
reform efforts targeted in a given state may be expected to spill over into neighboring states. On
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the other hand, reforms in a state surrounded by „bad‟ institutions could be of limited value as the
neighbors‟ policies may diffuse into the state. In this case, a reform would need to target an
entire region. This becomes even more important if the results presented above hold for
international constitutions. A more thorough study of constitutional change in a setting of spatial
dependence seems to be a clear extension of the empirical analysis presented here.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
5.1 Types of Strategic Interaction
The analysis of strategic interaction amongst governments has been a longstanding research
program in both public choice and public finance. Theoretical work in both the public choice
tradition [such as Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980), who view intergovernmental
competition as a constraint on Leviathan] as well as in public finance [such as Mintz and Tulkens
(1986) who analyze competition between jurisdictions in the context of efficient public goods
provision] has been followed by a voluminous empirical literature. The essays in this
dissertation follow this tradition, and explore areas of strategic interaction between governments
which were previously underdeveloped.
Chapter 2 presents a theoretical model combining the seminal paper by Weingast,
Shepsle, and Johnsen (1981) [who posit the „Law of 1/n‟ which states that as a legislature
increases in size, the amount of inefficient projects it passes will similarly increase] with the
Leviathan model of Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980). While each model predicts an
impact on government size following a change in the number of relevant jurisdictions (legislative
vs. administrative), the Leviathan theory predicts decreases in spending while the 1/n model
predicts the opposite. The key implication of the model presented in Chapter 2 is that the
relationship between the two types of jurisdictions, which varies greatly across the U.S. states, is
a key determinant of which effect will dominate.
Chapter 3 further explores the Leviathan hypothesis using two distinct approaches. First,
a Laffer curve model is used to compare the tax-setting behavior of local Pennsylvania
governments (municipalities, counties, and school districts) to the estimated revenue-maximizing
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rate. The further are the rates set by these governments from revenue-maximization, the less
„Leviathan-like‟ is their behavior. Second, a spatial autoregressive model is employed to
estimate the level of dependence between governments. We then present a new taxonomy of
government interaction using these two approaches.
Finally, Chapter 4 explores yet another type of strategic interaction between
governments. Specifically, it models diffusion of constitutional provisions across the U.S. states.
While policy diffusion has been studied in the political science and (to a lesser extent) public
economics literatures, spatial econometric methods have not been employed. There are several
theories which predict a spatial diffusion of constitutional rules, and Chapter 4 specifically
extends the logic of Holcombe‟s (1994) argument of constitutions serving as a substitute for
mobility, and tests it using spatial models.

5.2 Primary Findings
While the Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980) Leviathan hypothesis has been tested
repeatedly in the empirical literature, no clear consensus as to its validity has developed. While
many studies do find a negative relationship between measures of decentralization and
government size, nearly as many find either no relationship or even a positive effect. Chapter 2
argues that a possible explanation for these contradictory results is that previous studies have
neglected to control for the Law of 1/n. If increases in fiscal decentralization lead to increases in
the size of the legislature, the effect may appear ambiguous.
The theoretical model predicts, and the empirical analysis supports, this hypothesis.
Specifically, I find that increases in fiscal decentralization do lead to decreases in government
size, while increases in legislature size do lead to increases in spending. These results hold when
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tested separately and together. Further, and more interestingly, the effect of increased
decentralization is partially offset by the „1/n effect‟ and the degree to which this occurs is a
function of the „link‟ between administrative jurisdictions (such as counties) and legislative
districts. These results are robust to a variety of specifications, and to the exclusion of outliers or
states without county governments.
To this point, the majority of the work on strategic interaction in the literature has
focused on fiscal behavior and modeled tax and/or expenditure competition. These models
typically examine a given government‟s response to changes in tax/expenditure policy
undertaken by neighboring jurisdictions. Whether these empirical analyses are motivated by a
public choice theory of competition as a constraint or a public finance analysis of the potential
for a „race to the bottom,‟ these studies typically find evidence of strategic interaction in fiscal
behavior.
In Chapter 3, we employ two distinct models of tax competition and analyze the taxsetting behavior of three levels of local government in Pennsylvania. Our Laffer curve model
shows that municipalities (which are the most numerous) set taxes the furthest from revenuemaximization. Counties (which are the least numerous) set taxes nearer revenue-maximization.
Our spatial econometric models echo these results, with municipalities showing a higher degree
of spatial dependence than counties. School districts, however, set rates nearest revenuemaximization while simultaneously exhibiting the highest degree of spatial dependence. These
seemingly-contradictory results are only plausible if spatial dependence is not necessarily a
measure of competition, but can instead reflect its opposite, collusive behavior. Thus, we present
a taxonomy which uses the results of these two approaches to categorize the type of behavior
undertaken at each level of government.
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While Chapters 2 and 3 follow the majority of the literature by focusing on fiscal
implications of strategic interaction, in Chapter 4 I present the first spatial econometric analysis
of diffusion of constitutional rules. Following previous studies of diffusion and the work of
Holcombe (1994), I show that state constitutions are designed, at least in part, in response to
neighboring institutions. Specifically, all nineteen of the constitutional provisions (ranging from
the oft-studied, such as balanced budget rules, to the previously neglected, such as official
language provisions) considered exhibit spatial dependence in at least one of the specifications.
These empirical results are consistent with previous studies of diffusion, as well as the
theoretical model presented in the chapter.

5.3 Policy Implications and Future Research
These results have numerous policy implications. First, fiscal decentralization may not
necessarily lead to smaller government if it is accompanied by increases in the size of the
legislature. Similarly, large legislatures that are characterized by similarly large amounts of
intergovernmental competition may not necessarily be home to large governments. Chapter 2
shows that the link between administrative and legislative districts is a key factor in
understanding the relationship between the number of jurisdictions and government size. Any
attempts to reform government with the goal of limiting total expenditure need to be aware of
this relationship.
Further complicating the relationship between the number of governments and
government size is the issue of potentially collusive behavior. Chapter 3 provides a framework
for differentiating intergovernmental competition from cooperative behavior. As noted by
Brennan and Buchanan (1977, 1978, 1980), fiscal decentralization is not an effective constraint
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on Leviathan if it is subsequently circumvented by collusion. This seems to be the case with
school districts, as they receive a relatively high level of grants, face the unique complication of
negotiation with a single powerful teachers‟ union (essentially collectivizing a portion of their
finances by definition) and are organized under a single Department of Education. As before,
reforms targeting total expenditure need to take this type of cooperative behavior into account.
Finally, the diffusion of policy is important for attempts at constitutional reform. If a
state finds itself surrounded by „bad‟ institutions, any reform may not be as effective if these
neighboring institutions diffuse back into the state. On the other hand, if the reform is able to
diffuse into the neighboring states, an entire region‟s constitutional structure could be affected by
a reform in a single state. This becomes even more crucial if the results found in Chapter 4 can
be generalized to international constitutions. Clearly, a better understanding of this phenomenon
is needed to fully exploit it for constitutional reform.
While each of these essays has extended the existing literature by exploring new
questions in new ways, there is still quite a bit of work left for future research. The relationship
between the Leviathan and 1/n models indicates previous studies of fiscal decentralization may
have underestimated its effects by ignoring the legislature. Similarly, the 1/n effect may have
been overestimated by studies which ignore the role of fiscal decentralization. Future work in
these areas would do well to explicitly consider this relationship.
The current literature‟s reliance on spatial dependence as a measure of competition is
called into question by the results in Chapter 3. Specifically, a high degree of spatial dependence
may in fact suggest the exact opposite result: collusion. A second model, such as the Laffer
curve approach, is needed to truly identify the nature of spatial dependence. Previous studies of
the Leviathan hypothesis have assumed competition without testing for it, while the previous tax
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competition literature has not explicitly tested its consequences. A unified approach, such as the
taxonomy presented at the end of the chapter, will provide a fruitful avenue for future research.
Finally, the finding of spatial dependence in constitutional design leads to several
interesting research questions. First, a better understanding of the mechanism through which
diffusion takes place is needed. Further, if the origin of constitutional rules is spatially
dependent, then perhaps so is there effectiveness. Since the effectiveness of constitutional rules
has been the focus of the majority of the empirical constitutional political economy literature, the
exploration of these ideas in a spatial econometric framework would seem to be a logical next
step. Finally, as constitutional provisions exhibit spatial dependence, it will be interesting to see
what other types of institutions do as well.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 2.1: Excluding States with Outlying  Values (TX, RI, NH)
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita State and Local Expenditure
Specification:
1
2
3
4
Upper Chamber Seats
Lower Chamber Seats
Counties

10.065***
(0.970)
-3.013***
(0.287)
-2.425***
(0.318)

Upper Chamber Seats Squared
Lower Chamber Seats Squared
Counties Squared

-73.250***
(5.965)
3.023**
(1.417)
-4.982***
(1.335)
0.928***
(0.601)
-0.022***
(0.005)
0.022***
(0.006)

Upper Chamber Seats x Counties
Lower Chamber Seats x Counites

24.220***
(2.594)
-7.282***
(0.812)

-8.365***
(0.971)

-0.196***
(0.026)
0.053***
(0.008)

0.128***
(0.009)
-0.002
(0.003)

Upper Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap

5
18.770***
(1.607)
2.588***
(0.430)
-16.263***
(1.286)

-3.634***
(0.446)
10.176***
(0.643)

Lower Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap
Upper Chamber 

47.497***
(16.415)
-45.233***
(12.760)
12.887***
(1.759)
0.791***
(0.125)
110.691***
(9.064)
11.245
(8.412)
10.608***
(3.643)
0.040
(4.169)
-0.532***
(0.061)
-1.343
(1.057)

52.036***
(15.092)
-125.930***
(18.161)
13.719***
(2.485)
0.616***
(0.096)
80.631***
(7.849)
-6.122
(7.916)
10.377***
(3.787)
2.241
(4.276)
-0.287***
(0.069)
-2.868***
(1.049)

28.040
(17.120)
-47.067***
(12.913)
11.707***
(1.641)
0.763***
(0.122)
123.933***
(10.536)
16.622**
(8.453)
10.523***
(3.814)
-2.478
(4.143)
-0.709***
(0.071)
0.246
(1.354)

40.753**
(16.381)
-62.267***
(13.157)
13.261***
(1.818)
0.785***
(0.122)
103.466***
(8.656)
4.512
(8.496)
9.550***
(3.414)
4.041
(4.169)
-0.341***
(0.057)
0.244
(1.082)

33.148**
(15.807)
-69.020***
(12.296)
14.184***
(2.054)
0.646***
(0.108)
122.835***
(10.050)
13.950*
(8.193)
8.830**
(3.932)
-4.134
(4.087)
-0.826***
(0.072)
0.930
(1.050)

-147.051***
(17.223)
14.065
(43.902)
40.955***
(15.769)
-54.912***
(12.820)
14.222***
(1.672)
0.799***
(0.122)
110.653***
(9.284)
9.524
(8.797)
10.501***
(3.533)
5.097
(4.096)
-0.425***
(0.058)
-0.647
(1.001)

528
0.809

528
0.844

528
0.812

528
0.807

528
0.830

528
0.798

Lower Chamber 
Democrat Governor
Population Growth Rate
Population (millions)
Real Per Capita Federal Aid
Real Per Capita Personal Income
Percent Young (Age 5-17)
Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates
Percent Below Poverty Line
Population Density (pop/sq mi)
Percent White
Number of Observations
R-Squared

6

Note: All models include year and census region fixed effects. Constant and fixed effect coefficient estimates not
shown. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Appendix 2.2: Excluding States without County Governments (CT, RI, MA)
Dependent Variable: Real Per Capita State and Local Expenditure
Specification:
1
2
3
4
Upper Chamber Seats
Lower Chamber Seats
Counties

7.277***
(0.816)
-2.147***
(0.179)
-1.670***
(0.199)

Upper Chamber Seats Squared
Lower Chamber Seats Squared
Counties Squared

-67.870***
(7.002)
-0.996
(0.632)
-3.389***
(0.734)
0.869***
(0.074)
-0.003**
(0.001)
0.009***
(0.003)

Upper Chamber Seats x Counties
Lower Chamber Seats x Counites

10.713***
(1.379)
-2.245***
(0.203)

-4.636***
(0.735)

-0.052***
(0.010)
0.005**
(0.002)

0.080***
(0.006)
0.000
(0.004)

Upper Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap

5
9.029***
(0.872)
1.535***
(0.483)
-7.499***
(0.643)

-0.808***
(0.077)
4.012***
(0.569)

Lower Chamber Seats x Degree of Overlap
Upper Chamber 

22.247
(15.070)
-44.678***
(13.464)
10.930***
(1.739)
0.816***
(0.123)
130.000***
(12.823)
23.630***
(8.630)
8.961**
(3.807)
3.915
(4.375)
-0.495***
(0.068)
0.324
(1.144)

41.104***
(14.612)
-125.515***
(17.230)
12.027***
(1.999)
0.611***
(0.093)
88.075***
(10.726)
-2.292
(8.975)
9.936***
(3.862)
4.343
(4.271)
-0.248***
(0.070)
-1.557
(1.196)

20.470
(15.761)
-42.575***
(13.895)
8.242***
(1.740)
0.823***
(0.130)
130.879***
(12.784)
18.894**
(8.325)
8.326**
(3.985)
1.760
(4.361)
-0.496***
(0.072)
-0.272
(1.294)

3.541
(16.805)
-48.172***
(14.906)
11.797***
(1.880)
0.927***
(0.136)
108.182***
(10.968)
6.419
(7.728)
12.128***
(3.726)
9.288**
(9.288)
-0.082
(0.054)
0.807
(0.054)

25.246
(15.679)
-55.590***
(13.231)
9.472***
(1.814)
0.739***
(0.118)
135.640
(13.404)
19.989**
(9.788)
6.361
(4.032)
2.317
(4.164)
-0.573***
(0.072)
1.366
(1.366)

-52.220***
(6.800)
-72.528
(51.385)
6.552
(16.018)
-49.908***
(14.471)
12.450***
(1.770)
0.912***
(0.132)
114.211***
(11.546)
7.186
(8.121)
12.824***
(3.850)
10.938**
(4.512)
-0.161***
(0.057)
-0.500
(1.013)

528
0.797

528
0.834

528
0.793

528
0.773

528
0.807

528
0.766

Lower Chamber 
Democrat Governor
Population Growth Rate
Population (millions)
Real Per Capita Federal Aid
Real Per Capita Personal Income
Percent Young (Age 5-17)
Percent (Age 18+) High School Graduates
Percent Below Poverty Line
Population Density (pop/sq mi)
Percent White
Number of Observations
R-Squared

6

Note: All models include year and census region fixed effects. Constant and fixed effect coefficient estimates not
shown. Panel-corrected standard errors in parentheses: * indicates statistical significance at the 10% level, ** at the
5% level, and *** at the 1% level.
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Appendix 3.1: Descriptive Statistics
Effective Tax Rate (Mills)
Mean
Mode
Standard Deviation
Minimum
Maximum

Municipality
1.94
1.14
2.28
0.0001
81.31

County
3.48
3.15
1.18
1.30
7.17

School District
21.31
18.90
4.88
1.00
49.8

71.87
272.69

132.08
48.38

3656.14 (581.03)
2060.36 (288.82)

Real Per Capita Expenditures (Lagged, $1000s)
Mean
0.40
Standard Deviation
4.31

463.03
199.51

8.55 (1.45)
2.07 (0.35)

Real Per Capita State/Federal Grants ($1000s)
Mean
0.07
Standard Deviation
0.14

160.54
127.69

4.05 (0.70)
1.55 (0.30)

Population (1000s)
Mean
Standard Deviation

4.38
23.85

165.70
209.11

3.60 (24.41)
9.80 (70.90)

Real Median Household Income ($1000s)
Mean
Standard Deviation

---

37.49
7.31

---

Proportion African American
Mean
Standard Deviation

---

0.03
0.03

---

Proportion Student
Mean
Standard Deviation

---

0.16
0.02

---

Population Density
Mean
Standard Deviation

---

278.79
482.83

---

Per Capita Property Tax Revenue
Mean
Standard Deviation

Note: Variables calculated using alternative school district population in parentheses.
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